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RECENT CASES
Antitrust-A Combination of Physicians and Medical
Organizations Not Justified by the Exercise of
Professional Judgment When Based Upon
Non-Commercial Motivations
Respondents1 established a non-commercial blood bank2 and agreed
that only the whole human blood from this bank could be used in
area hospitals. 3 The Federal Trade Commission filed a complaint
charging that this conduct amounted to a conspiracy against the existing commercial blood banks 4 and thus unreasonably restrained interstate commerce in the sale and distribution of whole human blood
in violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.'
Respondents urged that the FTC lacked jurisdiction; 6 and in the
1. The respondents include three distinct groups: The first group is composed of
the Kansas City Area Hospital Association, its officers, directors, agents and hospital
members. The second group of respondents includes the Community Blood Bank of
the Kansas City Area, Inc., a non-profit organization, and its officers, directors, and
members. The third group of respondents consists of pathologists affiliated with various
hospitals in the Kansas City area.
2. This non-commercial bank was organized by the respondents because of their
opposition to existing commercial blood banks. One of the reasons for respondents'
objection was their belief that commercial blood banking is morally wrong or at least
professionally unethical. In addition, they felt that there was an increased likelihood
of the transmission of disease, especially hepatitis, through commercially obtained
blood because of reliance upon derelict donors who are less reliable in responding
to questions designed to establish the presence of disease. A third reason for respondents' resistance to commercial blood banking was their belief that such operations
should be directed by persons experienced in blood banking and that such commercial
operations should have the services of a pathologist or hematologist.
3. Specifically, respondents agreed not to use any blood supplied by the commercial
blood bank nor to permit such to be used in transfusions in area hospitals.
4. The two commercial blood banks affected by the alleged combination are owned
by individuals not connected with the local hospitals, the Hospital Association, or
Community Blood Bank. Both of the banks were properly licensed by the National
Institute of Health of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
5. "Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in commerce, are declared unlawful." 52 Stat. 111 (1938), 15 U.S.C. §
45(a) (1) (1964).
6. The respondents objected to the Commission's exercise of jurisdiction on the
ground that since the process of acquiring and supplying blood constitutes the
practice of medicine, the alleged combination to limit these efforts was nothing more
than a legitimate attempt by the medical profession to regulate medical matters.
The respondents also contended that the act of supplying human whole blood to
hospitals, even if not the practice of medicine, nevertheless constituted the furnishing of
a service rather than the sale of a commodity as required by the act. Finally, the
corporate respondents argued that they were non-profit corporations, and therefore
were not included within the definition of "corporation" found in section 4 of the
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alternative, that since their conduct was the product of professional
judgment devoid of any economic or commercial basis, it was beyond
the scope of the act. The hearing examiner concluded that the re-

spondents had unlawfully restrained the operations of the commercial
blood banks and issued an order designed to halt further concerted
action. On appeal to the Federal Trade Commission, held, affirmed.
The exercise of professional judgment when based upon non-commercial motivation does not justify a restraint of trade in violation
of the FTC Act when the existence of the unlawful combination is

established by sufficient evidence. Community Blood Bank of the
Kansas City Area, Inc., TRADE tc. RE'. 1f 17728 (Trade Cas.) (F.T.C.
1966).
The FTC Act was enacted to provide a means for preventing activities which could possibly ripen into Sherman Act violations but which

were not yet prohibited restraints of trade.7 Both individuals and

corporations are subject to the provisions of the act, with the latter
including non-profit as well as profit-making corporations!, Regardless
of whether the corporation operates for profit or not, however, courts
have found violations of the act only when the organization's activities have resulted in undue restraints upon competition and where a
commercial motive was apparent. Most non-profit corporations charged
with violations of this standard have been trade associations 9 involved
FTC Act, which includes ".

.

. any company . . . or association, incorporated or unin-

corporated, without shares of capital . . . which is organized to carry on business for
its own profit or that of its members." 52 Stat. 111 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 44 (1964).
7. Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 466 (1941).
See also FTC v. R. F. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 304, 310 (1934); FTC v.
Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 649-50 (1931). The FTC Act was interpreted to include
Sherman Act violations; therefore, a violation of the Sherman Act automatically
violates the FTC Act.
8. In 1920 the Sixth Circuit held that: "The language of the act affords no support
for the thought that individuals, partnerships, and corporations can escape restraint,
under the act, from combining the use of unfair methods of competition, merely
because they employ as a medium therefore an unincorporated voluntary association,
without capital and not itself engaged in commercial business." National Harness
Mfrs. Ass'n v. FTC, 268 Fed. 705, 709 (6th Cir. 1920). See also FTC v. Cement
Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948); FTC v. Pacific States Paper Trade Ass'n, 273 U.S.
52 (1927).
9. Trade associations are particularly susceptible to antitrust prosecutions. First, trade
associations exist to a great extent for the purpose of exchanging data among the
members in order to improve products and marketing procedures. These activities are
closely connected with competition, and touch upon sensitive antitrust, areas. Second,
the associations are necessarily comprised of groups of competitors and, therefore,
provide an atmosphere in which the ease of communication may result in an agreement,
either expressed or implied, which limits competitive activity. Finally, it is often
difficult for the government to determine whether a given market phenomenon-price
uniformity, for example-occurs because of the nature of the market itself or because
of trade association activities. Therefore, charges of conspiracy may be brought when
in fact the challenged price uniformity was the result of natural market forces. See
OPPENHmm Fanzir. AwNTITUST LAws 135-37 (1959).
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in price-fixing'0 or boycotting." Evidence of an express agreement
among the members of an association is seldom-if ever-required;
rather, the courts tend to examine the whole series of transactions
and events leading up to the charge of an unlawful conspiracy.12
However, the courts have used a different approach in the cases
involving professional organizations charged with FTC Act violations.
They have found violations of the act by pharmaceutical 13 and medical
organizations 4 and held that the professional status of the defendants
was no defense to the charge when the purpose and effect of their
combined activities was to restrain trade. In each instance, the
professional association's activities were based upon an express agreement 15 and were motivated by the probability of personal commercial
6
gain.'
In the instant case, having rejected the respondents' jurisdictional
objections, 7 the Commission proceeded to an examination of the
10. See, e.g., FTC v. Cement Institute, supra note 8; Eastern States Retail Lumber
Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
11. See, e.g., Fashion Originators" Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, supra note 7;
Millinery Creator's Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 469 (1941).
12. In FTC v. Cement Institute, the Supreme Court stated: "It is enough to warrant
a finding of a 'combination' within the meaning of the Sherman Act, if there is
evidence that persons, with knowledge that concerted action was contemplated and
invited, gave adherence to and then participated in a scheme." 333 U.S. at 716 n.17.
13. United States v. Utah Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 29 (D. Utah 1962);
Northern California Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. United States, 306 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962).
14. American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943). The Court held
that the District of Columbia division of the A.M.A. and its individual members had
conspired to prevent Group Health-a non-profit corporation organized by government
employees to provide medical care and hospitalization on a risk-sharing prepayment
basis-from carrying out its objects. Id. at 535-36.
15. In the two pharmaceutical association cases, supra note 13, the defendants had
circulated lists among their members setting forth the price to be charged for each
drug. In American Medical Ass'n v. United States, the District Society had adopted
the following resolution: "Whereas the Medical Society of the District of Columbia
has an apparent means of hindering the successful operation of Group Health Association, Inc., if it can prevent patients of physicians in its employ being received in the
local private hospitals ....
[1940-43] CCH ThADE CAs. ff 56010, at 35 (D.C. Cir.
March 4, 1940).
16. The allegations of the indictment in American Medical Ass'n v. United States,
supra note 14, at 529, specifically state that the defendants opposed Group Health "for
economic reasons, and because of fear of business competition .

. . ."

The presence

of such motivation in itself provided an explanation for the organization of the
combinations; therefore, the importance of an expressed agreement in relationship to
other evidence was diminished considerably.
17. The FTC first concluded that the fact that blood banks are generally supervised
by physicians and that medical skills may be utilized at various points in the
process before blood is transported to hospitals does not require a finding that it
cojastitutes the practice of medicine. Rather, when performed by licensed commercial
blood banks, the acts of acquiring, processing, and supplying blood to hospitals are
parts of a "business." The Commission also held that the supplying of human blood
is the sale of a product, rather than the furnishing of a service, and therefore within
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whole series of events, thereby establishing the existence of several
significant factors, 8 and concluded that an unlawful combination
existed, the effects of which imposed unlawful restraints upon the
operation of properly licensed commercial ventures. The Commission
next considered the respondents' contention that their conceited
actions were a legitimate exercise of professional judgment. The FTC
noted that the boycott imposed upon the commercial banks by the
respondents may have resulted from their belief that the commercial
ventures did not meet sufficiently high standards. Nevertheless, the
Commission concluded that the function of determining such standards
was governmental, and therefore, could not be assumed by private
organizations or individuals.' 9 The dissenters objected to the majority's
exercise of jurisdiction over a professional organization's activities in
the absence of evidence establishing that the respondents were
motivated by the prospect of commercial gain. In addition they urged
that since the respondents had a legitimate public interest in preventing the use of commercially procured human blood, their exercise of
professional judgment should be considered by the Commission in
determining the legality of the alleged conspiracy.
The instant case marks the first time that section 5 of the FTC
Act has been held to apply to professional organizations whose alleged
restraints of trade were non-commercially motivated. Where this
factor of commercial motivation was present in the previous professional cases, the courts justifiably refused to place the alleged conspirators in a separate category from the trade associations. The mere
fact that doctors rather than businessmen combined to advance their
competitive position and thereby restrained competition did not
prevent such activities from coming within the scope of the act.
However, where this motivational element is noticeably absent, as
in the instant case, the activities of the professional organization should
the meaning of "commerce" for purposes of FTC jurisdiction over alleged restraints
imposed upon such sales. Finally, the majority held that even though the corporate
respondents were non-profit organizations, they were not prevented frbm devoiing
any profits received to their own use, and therefore were included within the definition
of "corporation" found in section 4 of the FTC Act, supra note 6.
18. "Among these factors are the presence of a motive for a conspiracy, evidence
of opportunities for agreement through scheduled meetings of official groups, whether
the object of the alleged conspiracy was discussed at such meetings, commission of overt
acts consistent with the existence of a conspiracy, and accomplishment of an end which
also is consistent with a conspiracy." TRADE Re. REP. II 17728, at 23021.
19. "If the current standards of these inspecting organizations are not sufficient, or if
additional regulation is required, there are various administrative and legislative
remedies which may be pursued. A group of private citizens, no matter how public
spirited or altruistically motivated, may not relegate to themselves the essentially
governmental function of determining the standards which will be applied in theinterstate operation of blood banks and band together to inhibit the development
of licensed commercial banks which meet governmental but not their own self-impose&
standards." Id. at 23036.
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be viewed differently. Although a professional association should
not be able to insulate itself from application of the FTC Act, the
Commission should not impose liability for conduct which is the
result of an exercise of the physician's professional judgment without
first balancing the competing policies involved. That is, the public
interest in encouraging physicians to exercise their professional judgment in the particular situation, should be considered in light of the
act's underlying policy of preventing unlawful restraints of trade
which could develop into Sherman Act violations. The FTC's refusal
in the instant case to consider the exercise of professional judgment
as relevant in determining the legality of the respondents' actions
may significantly restrict an essential segment of the community in
performing its professional function and may lead to absurd results.
For example, a strict application of the FTC's decision might preclude
doctors in a medical society meeting from discussing the dangers of
prescribing thalidomide for pregnant women, since a subsequent
failure to prescribe the drug on an individual basis could result in a
reduction in a drug manufacturer's sales. The adoption of this strict
test of illegality constitutes an unwise reversal of the Commission's
implied policy of viewing the evidence in professional cases in a
different fashion from that in trade association cases. At a time when
a thorough and penetrating analysis of the competing policies was
needed because of the significant absence of either an express agreement or a commercial motive, both of which had been found in prior
professional cases, the Commission adopted a per se approach which
is inappropriate when applied to professional associations acting without commercial motive.20
20. This conclusion apparently has some congressional support as evidenced by a
recently proposed Senate bill which provides: "It would not be an act in restraint
of trade under the antitrust laws for any nonprofit blood bank, nonprofit reservoir
of other human tissue or organs, or any hospital or physician to refuse to accept
blood, tissue or organs from other blood banks or reservoirs." S. 628, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1967).
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Antitrust-Section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman
Act Permits Seller To Use a Pricing System
To Meet the Prices of Competing Goods of
Equal Saleability
After developing an efficient tufting process,1 Callaway Mills Co.
began to produce carpeting in competition with "old line" manufacturers. The practice of granting purchasers "annual graduated volume
discounts"2 was common in the market, and when the "old line'
manufacturers began to produce tufted carpeting, 3 Callaway adopted
a modified form of their volume discount pricing systems. 4 The
Federal Trade Commission charged that this system resulted in price
discrimination in violation of section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman
Act.5 Callaway admitted the section 2(a) violation, 6 but contended
that its discriminatory prices were justified under the "meeting the
competition" defense of section 2(b). 7 Although the hearing examiner
1. Tufting is a mechanized process of producing carpeting in which a continuous
loop of yarn is pushed through a backing and secured by the application of latex.
2. This system granted purchasers discounts ranging from 1% to 5% according to
the dollar-volume of purchases from the manufacturer during the given year. Under
this system, chain-store purchasers were permitted to compute their dollar-volumes
by totaling the purchases of their individual stores.
3. The carpeting industry is made up of many manufacturers. Each manufacturer
markets a "line" of carpeting. This line consists of many styles of various colors,
qualities, and designs.
4. The qualifying volumes of this schedule were lower than those required by
Callaway's competitors. For instance, to qualify for a 5% discount from one of
Callaway's competitors, a purchaser would have to buy from $60,000 to $105,000 worth
of carpeting over the year, but to qualify for a 5% discount from Callaway, the
customer needed to buy only $50,000 worth of tufted carpeting.
5. "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce . . . to discriminate
in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality....
where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent
competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of
such discrimination, or with customers, of either of them." Clayton Act § 2(a), 38
Stat. 730 (1914), as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act § 2(a), 49 Stat. 1526 (1936),
15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964).
6. This was by written stipulation made prior to the FTC hearing. It was also
agreed that Callaway's case would be limited to proof of the § 2(b) defense.
7. "Upon proof being made . . . that there has been discrimination in price or
services or facilities furnished, the burden of rebutting the prima-facie case thus
made by showing justification shall be upon the person charged with a violation of
this section . . . Provided, however, That nothing herein contained shall prevent a
seller rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing that his lower price or
the furnishing of services or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in,
good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities.
furnished by a competitor.' 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13(b).

(1964).
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upheld this defense, 8 the FTC reversed on the grounds that Callaway

had failed to show that its carpeting was chemically and physically
similar to that sold by its competitors at the same price levels, and
that Callaway had maintained a formal pricing system which had
undercut its competitors' prices.9
Court of Appeals, held, reversed.
different product styles, a seller
system to meet his competitors'
"saleability." Callaway Mills Co.
1966) .10

On appeal to the Fifth Circuit
Where a market consists of many
may establish a formal pricing
lower prices on goods of equal
v. FTC, 362 F.2d 435 (5th Cir.

Section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act accords an absolute
defense to a seller charged with a violation of section 2(a) of the
act upon proof that his discriminatory prices were granted in good
faith to meet the equally low prices of competitors." One prerequisite

to a successful defense under this section is proof by the seller that

he did not undercut his competitors' prices.' 2 Undercutting may come
about in two ways. First, the seller cannot set a lower price than his

competitors.' 3 Although the seller is not held to an exact meeting of
his competitor's price, he must show the existence of facts that would

lead a reasonable man to believe that he was in fact meeting that
price.' 4 Undercutting may also be found when the price of a
8. Callaway Mills Co., TRADE REG. BEP. (1961-63 Transfer Binder) ff 15412 (FTC
Sept. 29, 1961).
9. Callaway Mills Co. sub nom. Bigelow-Sanford Carpet Co., TRADE REm. Rrx. (196365 Transfer Binder) f[ 16800 (FTC March 8, 1964). In the dissent, Commissioner
Elman stated that the "like grade and quality" requirement of § 2(a) becomes
meaningless when transposed into § 2(b). Section 2(a) deals with discrimination
between purchasers of the seller's goods while § 2(b) is concerned with competing
products. The dissent further stated that pricing systems are condemned only when
lower prices are granted "as a matter of course" and not in response to lower competing
prices.
10. A companion case involving similar facts and identical issues was Cabin Crafts,
Inc. v. FTC, 362 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1966), in which the court used the same rationale
to uphold the § 2(b) defense.
11. FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 355 U.S. 396 (1958) (§ 2(b) held to accord an
absolute defense to seller who, in good faith met the equally low price of a competitor);
Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951) (Commission's contention that § 2(b)
was not an absolute defense refuted); Reid v. Doubleday & Co., 109 F. Supp. 354
(N.D. Ohio 1952) (motion to strike denied because § 2(b) is an absolute defense).
12. Atlas Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1959) (defendant could not sustain § 2(b) defense
if he had undercut competitor's price); FTC v. Standard Brands, Inc., 189 F.2d 510
(2d Cir. 1951) (no defense where seller granted lower prices on lower quantities than
competitor).
13. Ibid.
14. FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945) (dictum); Covey Oil Co. v.
Continental Oil Co., 340 F.2d 993, 998 (10th Cir. 1965) (competitor required to
divulge prices in order to determine whether seller acted reasonably); Forester Mfg.
Co. v. FTC, 335 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906 (1965) (seller
must show reasonableness in establishing 10% lower price than competitor). Accord-
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"premium" product is reduced to the level of less acceptable products.' 5 A product is deemed to. be a "premium" product if it enjoys a
6
greater degree of "public acceptance" than other products of its type.
This greater degree of "public acceptance" exists when it is found
that "the public is willing to buy the product at a higher price in a
normal market." 17 In making this latter determination, the courts and
the Commission have looked to advertising, packaging, and other
methods of product differentiation which may make the consuming
public willing to buy the product at a higher price than competing
products.' 8 An additional requirement for the "meeting the competition" defense is proof that the seller's discriminatory price reductions were made in response to individual competitive situations. 9
ingly, it has been held that incidental undercutting does not preclude the seller's
good faith. Balian Ice Cream v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356, 366 (9th Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956); Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 155 F.2d 1016

(2d cr. 1946).
15. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 54 F.T.C. 277 (1957), set aside on other grounds, 265
F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1959), rev'd, 363 U.S. 536 (1960) (price of a "premium" beer
reduced to the level of local beers); Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 44 F.T.C.
351 (1948), rev'd on other grounds, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 206 (1952) (reduction in price of automatic control to the level of less acceptable controls).
16. Gerber Prods. Co. v. Beech-Nut Life Savers, Inc., 160 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y.
1958) (reduction in price of baby food in glass containers to the level of that in
tin containers); Anheuser-Busch, Inc., supra note 15; Standard Oil Co., 49 F.T.C.
923, 952 (1953) ("public acceptance rather than the chemical analysis of the product is the important competitive factor"); Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co.,
supra note 15.
17. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., supra note 15, at 302; Austin, Meeting Competition in
Good Faith, and the "Premiun" Product, 14 Crxv.-M.n. L. REv. 610 (1965). It has
been suggested that this test be applied to determine "like grade and quality" for the
purposes of § 2(a) of the act. Borden Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1964),
reed, 383 U.S. 637 (1966), 19 V.ism. L. REv. 1919 (1966); Cassady & Grether, The
Proper Interpretation of "Like Grade and Quality" Within the Meaning of Section
2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 30 So. CAL. L. Rv. 241 (1957); Rowe, infra note
18. The writers advocating the application of the "public acceptance" test under
§ 2(a) contend that it would eliminate the pressure toward uniform pricing generated
by the chemical and physical comparison test and would thus promote rather than
frustrate the purposes of our antitrust legislation. However, the FTC and the Supreme
Court have not been receptive to these contentions. See FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S.
637 (1966), 19 VAND. L. lEv. 919.
18. See Rowe, Price Differentials and Product Differentiation: The Issues Under
the Robinson-Patman Act, 66 YALE L.J. 1 (1956).
19. FTC v. Standard Oil Co., supra note 11 (lower rates to four jobbers made in
response to competitive situations); Standard Motor Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d
674 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 826 (1959) (annual volume discount schedule
not responsive to individual competitive situations); C. E. Nichoff & Co. v. FTC, 241
F.2d 37 (7th Cir. 1957), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Moog Indus., Inc., 355
U.S. 411 (1958) (per curiam), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 941 (1958). It has also been
stated that a seller must meet a 'lawful" price. FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., supra
note 14. However, some lower courts have interpreted Staley as condemning the
meeting of an unlawful price only when the seller knows or should know that his
competitor's price is unlawful. Standard Oil Co. v. Brown, 238 F.2d 54 (5th Cir.
1956); Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., supra note 14.
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Thus price reductions granted pursuant to a formal pricing system are

generally unacceptable for the purposes of section 2(b) .20 Although
the cases have given no definition by which to determine the existence
of a pricing "system,"2 ' it is clear that pricing policies which allow
automatic reductions to all buyers meeting certain fixed qualifications

are unacceptable. 22 Thus, blanket price reductions which attract new
customers or give unnecessary reductions to old customers result in
more discrimination than is necessary to enable the seller to retain

his present competitive position and will preclude the seller from
establishing the section 2(b) defense.23

In the instant case, the court noted that proof of chemical and
physical similarities in grade and quality is not required under sec-

tion 2(b). To sustain his good faith, the seller need only prove that
his products generated public demand substantially equivalent to
those of his competitors at the same price levels. Thus, the court
held that Callaway did not have to show that its carpeting was of
"like grade and quality" with its competitors, but rather could establish the defense by proving that its carpeting was of equal "sale-

ability" with its competitors' at the same price levels. Considering
Callaway's method of pricing, the court noted that the many styles
of carpeting sold by each manufacturer made it administratively im-

possible for Callaway to determine the exact prices of its competitors;
furthermore, it was impossible to forecast the dollar-volume that each
purchaser would accumulate during the given year for the purposes
of determining his discount. The court further noted that pricing
20. Eig., Standard Motor Prods., Inc. v. FTC, supra note 19, at 677 (annual
volume discount schedule constituted a pricing system); C. E. Niehoff & Co. v. FTC,
supra note 19 (quantity discount schedule constituted a pricing system adopted to
meet competition generally).
21. See EDWADS, THE PlucE DIscRnmnATION LAW 546 (1959); Rowr, Pnuci
m ROBINSON-PATmAN AcT 2.30 (1962); Austin, RobinsonDiSCMINAToIN UnmE
Patman and Meeting Competition: A Myriad of Problems with No Solutions, 40 Tur,.
L. REv. 313, 325 (1966); Note, Pricing Systems and the Meeting Competition Defense, 49 VA. L. REv. 1325 (1963).
22. See, e.g., C.E. Niehoff & Co. v. FTC, supra note 19; E. Edelmann & Co., 51
F.T.C. 978, 1006 (1955), aff'd, 239 F.2d (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
941 (1958) (nationwide system designed to come close enough to competitors' prices
to retain most of seller's customers was unacceptable). The basis of the requirement
that prices be reduced in individual competitive situations seems to be a belief that
§ 2(b) is a defensive privilege extended to a seller threatened with an imminent loss
of customers to competitors who have offered them lower prices. Thus, a system
which attracts new customers or gives unnecessary reductions to old customers abuses
this privilege by causing more discrimination than is necessary to retain the seller's
present competitive position. See FTC v. Standard Oil Co., supra note 11; FTC v. A. E.
Staley Mfg. Co., supra note 14; Edelmann & Co., supra. Contra, Balian Ice Cream Co.
v. Arden Farms Co., supra note 14 (blanket price cut to all customers will not preclude
seller's good faith).
23. See, e.g., C. E. Niehoff & Co. v. FTC, supra note 19; E. Edelman & Co., supra
note 22.
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systems have never been condemned per se and that whether such
a system is proper must be determined on an ad hoc basis by deciding whether a reasonable and prudent man would have found the
adoption of the particular system an unreasonable method by which
to meet competitors' prices. In concluding, the court held that Callaway's pricing system did not preclude its good faith, since it was
"thoughtfully tailored . . . to meet... [its] individual problems in
the market."2 4
The words "like grade and quality" do not appear in section 2(b)
and to read them into that section could lead only to confusion and
harsh results. A seller knows or can easily determine the chemical
and physical composition of his product. Thus, while it is not unreasonable to prohibit price discrimination in the sale of a seller's
own goods that are chemically and physically alike, it may be wholly
unreasonable to require a seller to determine the chemical and physical composition of the many competing products in the market. In
addition to being expensive, this requirement may lead to legal impossibility25 due to patented processes or "secret" chemical ingredients.
However, a seller is generally apprised of market conditions and can
determine easily which products enjoy "public acceptance" equivalent
to his own at the same price levels. Thus by employing the "public acceptance" test, the courts have provided a reasonable method for the
seller to retain his position in the market by meeting his competitors'
prices. The use of this test also discourages predatory pricing by manufacturers of "premium" products by prohibiting them from reducing
their prices to the level of less acceptable products that may be chemically and physically the same.26 The instant court's approval of a pricing system in certain market situations furnishes an example of another
reasonable method of promoting competition under the Robinson24. 362 F.2d at 442. The court also stated that Callaway had not undercut its
competitors' prices by establishing lower qualifying volumes. Since its competitors
sold both woven and tufted carpeting, their buyers accumulated higher volumes and
thus qualified for higher discounts than Callaway's customers would have received on
equal purchases of tufted carpeting. Thus, the court held that Callaway's lower volumes
were a good faith attempt to equal its competitors discounts on sales of tufted
carpeting.
25. It has been stated that the Robinson-Patman Act does not intend to place an
impossible burden upon sellers. FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg: Co., supra note 14.
26. This is one ground upon which the "like grade and quality" determination of
§ 2(a) has been attacked. It has been stated that by ,relying solely upon chemical
and physical identities the courts have actually permitted discrimination. This occurs
when the buyer of a manufacturer's private-brand product must pay the same price
as the buyer of his brand-name product which is physically and chemically identical
to the private-brand product. Since the buyer of the private-brand product does not
receive the promotidnal value of the brand name, he is in effect paying, a higher
price than his brand-name competitor.,See .note-17 supra.
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Patman Act.27 Where a market is composed of many buyers and
sellers, it may be impossible for a seller to meet prices in individual

competitive situations, and he may thus be forced to adopt a formal

pricing system or lose many of his large purchasers to his competitors. 2

While new legislation is needed in the area of price discrimination,
the courts should not hesitate to interpret existing statutes in light

of such market realities as differentiated products and modem pricing practices. The realistic approach followed by the court in Calla-

way Mills would seem to produce results most consistent with our
basic antitrust policy of promoting competition.

Constitutional Law-First Amendment-State Legislature
May Not Require Local School Boards To Lend

Textbooks to Pupils of Parochial Schools
The New York legislature amended the state's laws to require local
boards of education to purchase and lend textbooks to children
enrolled in public or private high schools which conform to the
state's compulsory education standards.' In the Supreme Court of

New York, plaintiffs2 urged that the amendment violated constitutional prohibitions against public aid to religious institutions 3 and

27. It should be noted that under existing precedent Callaway's pricing system
would probably be condemned by the majority of courts. The system is not geared
to individual competitive offers, but grants discounts as a matter of course to all
customers. Thus, the majority would conclude that it is a pricing program "not
geared to individual competitive offers . . . but instead represents a nationwide system
designed to come close enough to its . . . principal competitors' pricing systems to
allow it to retain most of its customers and gain perhaps a few more." E. Edelmann &
Co., supra note 22, at 1006.
28. This is especially true when competitors are granting discounts which make
"net" prices difficult and sometimes impossible to determine.
1. "In the several cities and school districts of the state, boards of education
shall have the power and duty to purchase and to loan upon individual request, to
all children residing in such district who are enrolled in grades seven to twelve of a
public or private school which complies with the compulsory education law, textbooks.
[Such textbooks shall be those designated for use in public elementary or secondary
schools, unless otherwise approved by such boards of education.] Such textbooks are
to be loaned free to such children subject to such rules and regulations as are or
may be prescribed by the board of regents and such boards of education .
N.Y. EDuc. LAw § 701(3) (McKinney Supp. 1965).
2. Plaintiffs are local boards of education. For a discussion of their standing to
maintain the action, see note 14 infra.
3. Plaintiffs contended that the amendment violated the federal constitution which
says "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The plaintiffs also
urged that the amendment violated art. 11, § 4 of the New York constitution which
prohibits the state from using "its property or credit or any public money . . . directly
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sought to enjoin the Commissioner of Education from appropriating
any money for the purposes of the statute. The Commissioner contended that the amendment did not violate any prohibitions against
aid to religion, since the benefits of the amendment accrued directly4
to the students and not to the denominational schools themselves.
Held, for plaintiffs. A statute requiring the state to provide textbooks
to pupils of parochial schools contravenes the "establishment of
religion" clause of the United States Constitution, where such .aid
directly or indirectly benefits the institution. Board of Education v.
Allen, 273 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
In its initial interpretation of the "establishment clause" of the first
amendment, the Supreme Court upheld congressional appropriations
for a hospital operated by a religious order on the theory that title to
the property remained in the Government. 5 However, until the religious guarantees of the first amendment had been applied to the
states as a "fundamental concept of liberty" guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment,6 state aid to religious institutions had not been a
federal constitutional issue.7 The principal argument in favor of state
appropriations to aid pupils of private schools was developed in state
courts and was termed "the child benefit theory." Under this theory
the benefits of such aid accrued directly to the student and indirectly
to the state, but not to the private institutions. 8 The use of the
child benefit theory to support state legislation challenged as being
within the establishment prohibition of the Constitution was considered by the Court in Everson v. Board of Education.' The majority
accepted the theory and concluded that even though the first amendment prohibits both state and federal aid to religious institutions,
or indirectly, in aid or maintenance, other than for examination or inspection, of any
school or institution of learning wholly or in part under the control or direction of
any religious denomination ...... For a discussion of the holding on these New
York constitutional provisions, see note 15 infra.
4. This contention relies upon the "child benefit theory," discussed in note 8 infra
and accompanying text.
5. Bradfield v. Roberts, 1751U.S. 291 (1899).
6. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
7. State aid to students of private schools was considered in Cochran v. Board of
Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930). The Court rejected contentions that the appropriation
of public money for such students violated the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, holding that there was a sufficient public purpose, "exclusive of private
concern," to justify the expenditures.
8. This theory was accepted in Louisiana, not against contentions of violation of
state constitutional religious prohibitions, but against due process arguments. Borden
v. Board of Educ., 168 La. 1005, 123 So. 655 (1929). (textbooks). Borden was affirmed
by the United States Supreme Court as a companion case to Cochran, supra note 7. The
New York courts, however, have rejected the theory. Smith v. Donahue, 202 ,App.
Div. 656, 195 N.Y.S. 715 (1922) (textbooks). See also Judd v. Board of Educ., 278
N.Y. 200, 15 N.E.2d 576 (1938) (bus transportation).
9. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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that amendment had not been violated since the benefits of the statute
in question accrued directly to the parents of the students and not to
the institution. 10 The minority construed the statute as authorizing
direct aid to the religious schools and warned that if such acts were
permissible, then regulation of them was also possible; such regulation was a clear violation of the first amendment. For sixteen years
after its decision in Everson, the Court did not rely upon any single
test or theory, but rather used an ad hoc approach in determining the
scope of the establishment prohibition as applied to state legislation."
In 1963, in Abington School Districtv. Schempp,12 however, the Court
stated that if the purpose and primary effect of the state statute 13 were
secular, the enactment would not violate the first amendment.
In its consideration of the federal constitutional question, 4 the court
10. "The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least
this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
Neither can force nor influence a person to go or to remain away from church against
his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can
be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to
support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or vhatever
form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church
and state."' Id. at 15-16. Jefferson's reference to a "wall of separation" was included
in a letter to the Danbury Baptist Association, quoted in Rafalko, The Federal Aid to
Private School Controversy: A Look, 3 DUQUESNE U.L. REv. 211, 213-14 (1965).
11. MeCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (invalidated provision for
religious instruction on public school property); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952)
(upheld release of public-school students to attend religious services outside school);
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (invalidated provision for reading of "regents
prayer" in public schools). See also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961)
(upheld Sunday closing law as based on social needs).
12. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
13. "The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and the primary
effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then
the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there
must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor
inhibits religion." Id. at 222.
14. The Commissioner urged that the plaintiffs bad neither the standing nor the
capacity to question the constitutionality of the state statute, since they were local
school boards which are agencies of the state. In sustaining the plaintiffs' standing to
maintain the action, the court held that a board "is more than a mere agent of the
State. It is an entity performing a state purpose pursuant to the mandate of the
people as directed by their constitution." 273 N.Y.S.2d at 242. The board is required
to manage and control the local schools, pursuant to the education laws, but if such
laws would require the board to perform an unlawful act, the board should have
the right to seek redress, "as it may deem necessary for the protection and preservation of school funds and property." Furthermore, since the board manages its own
property in the administration of local schools, an act such as the one here questioned,
if unlawful, would have the effect of depriving the board, and ultimately the citizens
of the school district, of their property without due process of law.
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in the instant case determined that the statute violated the establishment clause of the first amendment by providing indirect state aid to
parochial schools.' 5 It reasoned that if the parents and parochial
schools came to rely upon a continuous supply of books from public
sources, the decision as to whether certain possibly objectionable
books should be used might well be affected by this conditioned
reliance. In addition, parents, faced with a decision between continuing to send their children to the parochial school and sending them
to a public school in order to take advantage of free books, would have
their freedom of religion impaired by the state action in violation of
the first amendment. Thus, the court held the statute unconstitutional,
in spite of possible implications for "many federal and state programs
in aid of students 16attending private educational institutions under
religious auspices."
The voluminous commentary on the relationship between first
amendment concepts' 7 and various tax-supported assistance programs
is directed primarily toward two basic issues: 1) whether a particular
aid program benefits an individual or an institution; and 2) whether
such a program which does aid a religious institution is necessarily
unconstitutional. Classifying aid according to whether the student or
the institution is benefited requires a prior determination of the
proper source for such aid.18 If textbooks should be supplied by the
students themselves regardless of the school they attend, then under
the child benefit theory there is no apparent aid to the school, and the
grant can be justified on the ground that a good education results in
a desirable public asset-an educated citizenry. 19 However, if schools
should supply textbooks for their students, then any state assistance
in procuring those books clearly benefits the school.20 Assuming that
15. The court also found a violation of the New York state constitution, note 3 supra,
holding that the statute here provided the specifically prohibited indirect aid. This
decision was directly in line with state precedent, set forth in Smith v. Donahue, supra
note 8, and Judd v. Board of Educ., supra note 8.
16. 273 N.Y.S.2d at 247.
17. The main thrust of the discussion here will be based upon the first amendment,
as opposed to state constitutional restrictions. For the most part, state restrictions are
more explicit, but it has been suggested that by applying Everson to the first amendment we have little difference between state and federal bases for the controversy.
La Noue, The Child Benefit Theory Revisited: Textbooks, Transportation and Medical
Care, 13 J. Pun. L. 76, 88-89 (1964).
18. The idea of "classification" as a phase of the controversy is set forth in
Cushman, Public Support of Religious Education in American Constitutional Law, 45
ILL. L. REv. 333 (1950).
19. Rafalko, supra note 10, at 222.
20. Note also that if the book item is eliminated from the school budget, and if
the same amount of money is subsequently expended on the school budget, a greater
percentage and greater actual amount may be allocated to religious instruction. This is
the indirect aid to religious institutions which often is attacked. There seems to be
little question that parochial schools integrate ordinary. secular education (e.g.,
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the first amendment prohibits a direct subsidy to parochial schools, it

seems illogical to preclude the state from giving books to those schools,
while permitting gifts directly to their students. A more realistic

conclusion would be that supplying textbooks to either the parochial
school or its students constitutes aid to the parochial institution. If
this effective aid to the institution is prohibited, however, and if the
arguments against providing books to parochial pupils are extended

only slightly, such widely accepted programs as provisions for school

lunches,2 ' pupil health programs, 2 and governmental loans to college

students2 may be challenged. Thus, incorporation of first amendment
religious guarantees into the fourteenth amendment 4 creates possible
problems for future public aid programs since states may either be
completely precluded from granting such aid, or they may have to
subject the grant to certain conditions.25 Assuming that the states
must attach conditions to grants of aid, however, any such conditions
might be vulnerable under the first amendment as interference with
the free exercise of religion. Furthermore, aside from any positive
state control, there is the problem of religious discrimination in the

schools themselves. For example, religious schools often permit only
members of the church to attend.2 6 This is religious discrimination,

whether considered reasonable or not, and Everson indicated that such
discrimination would be a denial of equal protection if the discriminatory practices were attributable to the states. Since the Supreme
Court has held that even the slightest state connection is sufficient to
mathematics and spelling) with sectarian instruction. See Drinan, Should the State
Aid Private Schools?, 37 CoNN. B.J. 361 (1963). In fact, this is ostensibly the very
purpose of parochial schools. Everson v. Board of Educ., supra note 9, at 22-23
(dissenting opinion of Jackson, J.), 59 (dissenting opinion of Rutledge, J.); La Noue,
supra note 17, at 92.
21. Lunches are usually justified on the ground that this insures wholesome food
for all children in school and therefore tends to benefit the public in general. Comment,
33 Rocar MT. L. REv. 355, 359 (1961).
22. Such programs are justifiable purely on traditional police power-public welfare
arguments. Statutes indicating this purpose and justification include Mic. STAT. ANN.
§ 15.3622 (Supp. 1965); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 14.379(1) (Supp. 1965).
23. These loans may be justified either on equal protection grounds or on the
idea that better-educated persons are better citizens. Rafalko, supra note 10, at 219.
For an extensive list of existing federal aid programs of this nature, see id. at 219-21
and nn.27-68.
24. Cantwell v. Connecticut, supranote 6.
25. The attaching of conditions indicates control, and control of religious activities
by the state has long been seen as one of the evils to be avoided by the first amendment. Note, 77 HArv. L. REv. 1353, 1357 (1964). However, states already exercise
considerable control over the curriculum of parochial schools, by setting standards which
must be met if the school is to fall within the state compulsory education law.
Drinan, supra note 20, at 365. Moreover, such conditions are not unknown in federal
programs. For example, racial and religious discrimination in federally financed
housing was forbidden by executive order. Exec. Order No. 11063, 27 Fed. Reg.
11527 (1962).
26. Comment, 63 Mic. L. 11Ev. 142, 150 (1964).
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permit invocation of the fourteenth amendment, 27 there may be
sufficient state action to bring religious discrimination in private
sectarian institutions under the fourteenth amendment if those schools
are the beneficiaries of some type of public aid.2 8 But if the primary
aim of such programs is to benefit the public by supplying the means
for achieving ends which are completely secular, any aid which
accrues to religious institutions may be considered purely incidental.
Does the first amendment require that these incidental benefits defeat
public programs whose paramount goal is societal? To answer "yes"
would be to admit that the church may interfere with the state.
This raises the second issue mentioned above, i.e., if the benefit which
accrues to the institution is seen as incidental to a substantial benefit
to the general public, it may not matter that the institution is so
benefited. If this view is accepted, the problem becomes that of
determining how much benefit to the institution will be permitted
before the first amendment demands severance. 29 This suggests that
the problem is partially sociological or political in nature, rather than
strictly legal. 30 Fortunately, the particular language of the first
amendment permits interpretation in light of the prevailing values of
the times, and a practical solution would seem to be to ask not only
"whether the statute aids religion but whether the statute presents any
27. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
28. This becomes even more significant in the more subtle forms of discrimination
which might appear. For example, it would violate the beliefs of an Orthodox Jew
were he required to receive his education in a room adorned by a crucifix and presided
over by a Catholic Sister. Such a requirement would clearly violate his right freely
to exercise his religion, but it would appear to be equally objectionable that he should
be precluded from attending such an institution by the mere presence of such symbols
of a different religious faith. This is so only if we assume that he has a right against
such discrimination, but such right may be derived from the argument suggested
above.
29. It may be argued that it is impossible to erect a complete "wall of separation"
between church and state. For example, if the state supplies books to parochial students/institutions, this is state aid to the inculcation of religious ideas-probably in
violation of the first amendment-but if the state supplies books to public school
students but denies them to parochial students because they attend parochial schools,
this is interference by the state with a completely free exercise of choice by parents and
students with regard to religious education-in violation of the "free exercise" clause
of the first amendment and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Note that problems under the "free exercise" clause and the "establishment" clause of
the first amendment are closely related. Note, 41 No= DAmm LAw. 681, 718 (1966).
Concerning the problems under the equal protection clause, see Note, 32 BRooIMiN L.
REv. 362, 382 (1966). It may also be contended, under the "value received" theory,
that since a parochial school performs valuable functions for the state, the schools
should be compensated accordingly. Drinan, supra note 20, at 366; Rafalko, supra
note 10, at 222. However, if the state is forbidden to grant such aid, the school may
not be constitutionally entitled to such aid. Cushman, supra note 18.
30. Canavan, Implications of the School Prayer and Bible Reading Decisions: The
Welfare State, 13 J.Pun. L. 439 (1964).
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of the particular dangers the first amendment is intended to prevent,"31
in light of the prevailing social and political values.

Constitutional Law-Imports Shipped Directly to
Dealer Under Consignment Contracts With the
Importer Are Not Immune to State Taxation
Under the Import-Export Clause
Plaintiff, a Washington corporation, purchased fertilizer in Canada
and imported it in bags into the United States for sale. A majority of
these containers1 were shipped directly from Canada to individual
dealers in Oregon under consignment contracts in which the title
to the consigned goods remained in the plaintiff until sold by the
dealers. Defendant, Oregon State Tax Commission, levied an ad
valorem property tax2 on the unsold fertilizer in the possession of the
dealers. In an action for refund of the taxes paid, the state court
accepted the plaintiff's contention that the sacks of fertilizer were
immune from state taxation under the import-export clause of the
United States Constitution,3 since they were unsold goods in their
original packages and were considered to be "in the hands of the
importer" due to his retention of tide. On appeal to the Supreme
Court of Oregon, held, reversed. Unsold goods imported for sale and
delivered by the importer to a consignee who is a dealer in such
merchandise do not retain their character as imports and are, therefore,
outside the protection of the constitutional immunity from state
taxation. Cominco Products,Inc. v. State Tax Commission,411 P.2d 85
(Ore.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 830 (1966).
Article I, section 10, of the United States Constitution prohibits
taxation of imports by the states and vests that power exclusively in
the federal government. The United States Supreme Court first
31. Note, supra note 25, at 1357. The test presently employed by the Court, quoted
in note 13 supra, could be applied so as to achieve this purpose, but it tends to point
only to the form of the challenged measure. Another possible approach would suggest
that "The task of the court is to identify the competing interests, weigh and appraise
them carefilly, and in the process of judging allow great discretion to the legislature
in the choice of the interest to be served." Rafalko, supra note 10, at 215-16.
1. The plaintiff stored the remainder of the goods in public warehouses in Oregon.
The State Tax Commission conceded that this merchandise was immune from taxation.
2. The Oregon statute provides: "All real property within this state and all tangible
personal property situated within this state, except as otherwise provided by law,
shall be subject to assessment and taxation in equal and ratable proportion." Oun.
REV. STAT. § 307.030 (1965).
3. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 10, states in relevant part: "No State shall, without the
consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what
may be absolutely necessary for executing it's inspection Laws .... "
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interpreted this clause in Brown v. Maryland,4 invalidating a Maryland
statute imposing a license tax on importers and sellers of foreign
articles or commodities. Although noting that the general purpose of
the constitutional provision was to prevent economic discrimination
against the non-importing states, the Court declared, "that there must
be a point of time when the prohibition ceases and the power of the
state to tax commences . ...5 This point was reached when the
importer so acted upon the imported article, either by sale or by
removal from its original package, that it lost its "distinctive character
as an import" and became "incorporated and mixed up with the mass
of property in the country . ..,, In subsequent cases, this "original
package" doctrine was treated as a constitutional mandate defining
the scope of the import-export clause 7 and was applied to protect
articles imported other than for sale8 and to invalidate taxes which
were nondiscriminatory in nature. 9 However, in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Bowers,10 the Supreme Court rejected the "original
package" argument and permitted state taxation of imported raw
materials placed in reserve inventory of the manufacturer to supply
current operational needs.' In holding that the goods were so "irrevocably committed to 'use in manufacturing'" 2 as to lose their
distinctive character as imports, the Court stated, "That the package
has not been broken is... only one of several factors to be considered
in factually determining whether the goods are being 'used for the
purpose for which they [were] imported."'-13 Thus the scope of the
".

4. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
5. Id. at 441.
6. Id. at 441.
7. See Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp. v. Alabama, 288 U.S. 218 (1933) ("[T]he
Alabama statute, construed to impose a tax upon appellant for selling in that State in
the original packages the nitrate imported by it from Chile, is repugnant to the
...
Id. at 219); May v. New Orleans, 178 U.S. 496
imports and commerce clauses.
(1900) ("[A] tax upon the thing imported during the time it retains its character as
an import and remains the property of the importer, 'in his warehouse, in the original
form or package in which it was imported,' is a duty on imports within the meaning
of the Constitution ... ").
8. Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945) ("original package" protection was given to goods imported for use in manufacture).
9. Low v. Austin, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 29 (1871) (nondiscriminatory personal property tax held invalid as applied to foreign imports held for sale). In this case the
Court declared that the authority given to import necessarily carried with it a right
to sell the goods in their original package.
10. 358 U.S. 534 (1959).
11. The question of whether the use of imported articles to meet the current operational needs of a manufacturer would result in loss of tax immunity was discussed in
Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, supra note 8, but decision on this issue was expressly
withheld. 324 U.S. at 667.
12. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, supranote 10, at 546.
13. Id. at 548-49.
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"original package" doctrine, at least in cases involving goods imported
for manufacture, was significantly restricted. In a subsequent case,
however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court strictly applied the doctrine to
strike down a tax on goods which had been imported for sale. 14
In the instant case, the court refused to apply the "original package"
doctrine to goods imported and held for sale in their original containers by dealers under consignment contracts. It stated that the
import-export clause should be strictly construed to prevent the
words of the prohibition from being carried beyond their intended
object-that is, the prevention of discrimination against non-importing
states. Guided by this principle, the court rejected plaintiffs contention that the goods in the possession of the dealers were goods in
the hands of the importer and concluded that the tax on the unsold
fertilizer was valid.
The decisions in the instant case and in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
permit a more rational determination of the "point of time" when
the prohibition of the import-export clause ceases. Since it refused
to apply the "original package" doctrine, the Oregon court may have
felt the decision in Youngstown applied to cases involving goods
imported for sale as well as goods imported for manufacture. Such
a conclusion appears logical. In either situation the condition of the
container should be no more than a factor to be considered. The
concern of the Constitution was not with the shipping cases but
with the character of the goods as imports, and thus, neither unpacking nor sale should necessarily result in loss of immunity. 15 The goods
in this case lost their character as imports because possession had
passed to the retail dealers under consignment contracts. Thus, in
determining whether goods have retained their character as imports,
courts in future cases should consider whether the goods have been
sold, their packages broken, or their possession transferred.
Regardless of the instant case's effect on the "original package"
doctrine, the court's conclusion is sound 16 and consistent with the
leading precedent, Brown v. Maryland.17 In that decision, Chief
Justice Marshall explicitly refrained from establishing the "original
package" doctrine as a constitutional standard by stating that it
14. State ex rel. H. A. Morton Co. v. Board of Review, 15 Wis. 2d 330, 112 N.W.2d
914 (1962).
15. Powell, State Taxation of Imports-When Does an Import Cease To Be an Import?,
58 HAv. L. BEv. 858, 867-68 (1945).
16. There is good basis for the conclusion that the instant case does not affect the
"original package" principle and that its holding should be limited to the unique
factual situation involved. Indeed, this case is the first involving consignment contracts
through which the importer sells the imported goods without having obtained possession
of them. Perhaps the court has merely recognized this peculiar set of facts as calling
for an exception to the "original package" doctrine.
17. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
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would be "premature to state any rule as being universal in its
application."' 8 By strictly construing the import-export clause, the
Oregon court accepted Marshall's view that there must be a "point
of time" when constitutional immunity is removed from imported
goods. Indeed, there are compelling reasons for allowing state taxation of imported goods as a part of a property tax which is in no way
selective. 19 In the field of state taxation of interstate commerce, these
reasons have long been recognized and the Supreme Court has rejected
the application of the "original package" doctrine20 in favor of an
approach utilizing economic criteria.2 ' The import-export clause was
intended to achieve certain economic effects, primarily the prevention
of inequality and discrimination between importing and non-importing
states.22 In enforcing the clause, therefore, the courts should consider
not only the course and condition of the imported article, but also
the economic consequences of the application of the tax, both to the
state and to the importer. The application of the "original package"
doctrine as a constitutional standard, rather than as a rule of construction, would, thus, seem to be an inappropriate method of
producing results consistent with the underlying purpose of the clause.

Constitutional Law-Reapportionment-One ManOne Vote Principle Applies to Popularly Elected
Local School Boards
Plaintiffs, residents of the Fifth School Zone of Rutherford County,
Tennessee, instituted an action for declaratory judgment and injunctive
relief in federal district court challenging the provisions of a Tennessee
act' pertaining to apportionment of the Rutherford County School
Commission. The act in question provided for a school commission of
eleven members, one to be elected from each of eleven school zones.
The fifth school zone contained approximately one-third of the total
population of the county2 and was three to fifteen times more
18. Id. at 441.
19. A tax imposed on domestic goods which cannot be imposed upon imported
goods of a comparable nature results in discrimination against domestic products; and
the state, by rendering protective services such as fire and police protection, or by
providing certain privileges, should be able to assess the recipients of these services and
privileges. 47 GEo. L.J. 798, 799 (1959).
20. Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123 (1868).
21. See, e.g., Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946).
22. Note, 47 Comm. L. REv. 490, 491 (1947).
1. Pmv. AcTs TEN. 1943, ch. 426, at 1488, as amended.
2. The fifth school zone contains most of the City of Murfreesboro and an area outside the city. According to the 1960 census, Rutherford County had a total population
of 52,368 and the City of Murfreesboro contained 18,991. Tm&,. BLuE BooK 1965-66.
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populous than each of the other ten zones. 3 Plaintiffs contended

that the wide disparity between the population of the fifth school
zone and that of the other zones deprived them of equal representation
on the commission, and, therefore, constituted invidious discrimination

contrary to the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Defendants, sued in their representative capacity as members of the

Rutherford County School Commission, admitted the disparity in
population, but contended that the "one man-one vote" standard of
Reynolds v. Sims4 did not extend to a local representative governmental body which was primarily administrative rather than legislative

in character.5 A three-judge federal district court, held, judgment for

the plaintiffs. The apportionment provisions of the act constitute invidious discrimination contrary to the "one man-one vote" standard

and are therefore void as violative of the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment. Strickland v. Burns, 256 F. Supp. 824
(M.D. Tenn. 1966).

In Reynolds v. Sims, the Supreme Court held that state legislatures
must be apportioned on the basis of "one man-one vote;"6 however,
the Court has not decided whether the Reynolds standard is applicable

to local representative governmental units. Nevertheless, the majority
of federal and state courts have extended the "one man-one vote"
standard to the apportionment of such local governmental units as
county boards of supervisors,7 city councils, 8 and state constitutional

conventions.9 On the other hand, the principle has been held inap3. According to the 1950 census, the fifth school zone contained a total population of
15,293, the next largest zone 5,034, and the smallest 1,023. The variance in the
numbers of qualified voters is even more profound with the fifth zone (according to
1965 figures) containing 10,110 while the next largest zone contained 2,319 and the
smallest zone 455. Thus there are ratios of approximately 5 to 1 and 20 to 1 respectively. See Strickland v. Burns, 256 F. Supp. 824, app. at 829 (M.D. Tenn. (1966).
4. 377 U.S. 533 (1964), 17 VARY. L. lEv. 1519 (1964).
5. The commission's powers, derived solely from the legislature, included the hiring
of teachers and school employees, regulation of pupil transportation, approval of the
annual school budget and the purchase of supplies and equipment. The commission
had no tax-levying powers.
6. Actually the phrase "one person-one vote" was first used in Gray v. Sanders, 372
U.S. 368, 381 (1963).
7. Bianchi v. Griffing, 238 F. Supp. 997 (E.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 382 U.S. 15
(1965); Miller v. Board of Supervisors, 63 Cal. 2d 343, 46 Cal. Rptr. 617, 405 P.2d
857 (1965) (applying state statute requiring equal population districting); Hanlon v.
Towey, 142 N.W.2d 741 (Minn. 1966); Mauk v. Hoffman, 87 N.J. Super. 276, 209
A.2d 150 (Ch. 1965); Augostini v. Lasky, 46 Misc. 2d 1058, 262 N.Y.S.2d 594 (Sup.
Ct. 1965); Bailey v. Jones, 139 N.W.2d 385 (S.D. 1966); State ex rel. Sonneborn v.
Sylvester, 26 Wis. 2d 43, 132 N.W.2d 249 (1965). See also Lynch v. Torquato,
343 F.2d 370 (3d Cir. 1965) (dictum).
8. Ellis v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 352 F.2d 12.3 (4th Cir. 1965);
Seaman v. Fedourich, 16 N.Y.2d, 94 262 N.Y.S.2d 444,209 N.E.2d 778 (1965).
9. State ex rel. Smith v. Gore, 143 S.E.2d 791 (W. Va. 1965).
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plicable to judicial elections'

°

and local political party central com-

mittees." The courts in applying the "one man-one vote" principle to

cases involving local governmental units have combined the Reynolds
extension of equal protection to legislative reapportionment with

earlier Supreme Court decisions declaring the equal protection clause

applicable to political subdivisions of the states. 2 These courts reason

that although Reynolds holds only that the composition of the
legislature must conform to the principle of equal representation, prior

decisions have declared that the exercise of powers by political subdivisions are subject to the same equal protection limitations as are

imposed on the legislatures. Therefore, it logically follows that the
"one man-one vote" principle applies to the political subdivisions of

the legislature. 13 Support for this conclusion is also found in the
policy argument that important legislative functions performed by
these local governmental units, such as taxation and regulation, so

affect the local citizenry that their composition should accurately
reflect the voice of the electorate. However, three district courts have

held that the Reynolds standard does not apply to local representative
units14 since they are mere political arms of the state whose powers

are created and limited by the legislature.' 5 Thus, so long as the
citizens are afforded equal protection by true equality of representation in the legislature, they are, in effect, also afforded equal representation at the local governmental level. Although at least one

writer' 6 was of the opinion that the Reynolds standard would not be
applied to local governmental units which were created to perform

a special function, 17 a federal district court in Pennsylvania has held
10. Stokes v. Fortson, 234 F. Supp. 575, 577 (N.D. Ga. 1964) (judges not "representatives" and do not espouse the cause of particular constituency).
11. Lynch v. Torquato, supra note 7.
12. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 344-45 (1960) (invalidating change of
city boundaries to exclude Negroes); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958) (school
desegregation).
13. However, two courts have stated that a local body exercising solely administrative duties would not be subject to the Reynolds standard. State ex rel. Sonnebom v.
Sylvester, supranote 7; Bailey v. Jones, supra note 7.
14. Moody v. Flowers, 256 F. Supp. 195 (M.D. Ala.), prob. juris. noted, 385 U.S.
966 (1966) (county board); Sailors v. Board of Educ., 254 F. Supp. 17 (W.D. Mich.),
prob. juris. noted, 385 U.S. 966 (1966) (local school board); Johnson v. Genesee
County, 2329 F. Supp. 567 (E.D. Mich. 1964), 18 Sw. L.J. 749 (1964) (county board
of supervisors). However, this case was decided only three days after Reynolds.
15. See also Weinstein, The Effects of the Federal Reapportionment Decisions on
Counties and Other Forms of Municipal Government, 65 CoLum. L. REv. 21, 27 n.26
(1965).
16. Id. at 34-35.
17. E.g., school boards, zoning commissions, fire protection, water supply. A distinction is usually made between general-purpose and special-purpose units of local
government, the former including city councils and county boards, the latter school
boards. See Weinstein, supra note 15, at 22 n.7.
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that a local
school board must be elected in accordance with that
8
standard.1
In the instant case, Judge Gray stated that the rationale of Reynolds,
prohibiting invidious discrimination based on residence, "is logically as
applicable to the backwaters of representative government at the local
level as to the fountainhead of representative government at the state
level." 19 He found no basis for applying the "one man-one vote" rule
to the "congeries" of power possessed by the legislature and at the
same time denying its application to a subordinate body simply because its powers were limited. Although the court held that the
apportionment provisions of the act constituted invidious discrimination and were void, it witheld injunctive relief until the new legislature
could enact a new scheme,20 since "the formulation of a constitutionally
acceptable method ...is more properly a legislative function than a
judicial one." 21 In dissent, Judge Phillips2 stated that the Reynolds
doctrine did not extend to local agencies created to perform purely
administrative functions. Since these school commissions were subject
to unlimited control of the legislature, 2 he felt the court could not
assume that a validly apportioned legislature would fail to correct any
malapportionment
existing in its "arms, agencies and instrumental24
ities."

18. Delozier v. Tyrone Area School Bd., 247 F. Supp. 30 (W.D. Pa. 1965) (one
representative from a township with a population of 410 exercised seven times the
voting power of three other townships). Contra, Sailors v. Board of Educ., supra note
14. One voter from a district with a population of 99 exercised 200 times the voting
power of a voter from the district of Grand Rapids with a population of 201,777 and
55.6% of the total population of the county. Each of 39 districts within the county
had one vote in the election of each of five members to the county board of education.
19. Citing Ellis v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, supra note 8; Bianchi v.
Grilling, supra note 7; and Delozier v. Tyrone Area School Bd., supra note 18, Judge
Gray stated that a substantial majority of courts considering questions of apportionment
of local governmental bodies have arrived at the same conclusion. However, Delozier
is factually distinguishable since in that case the school board had the power to levy
taxes.

20. The next Tennessee legislature will be validly apportioned for the first time. Baker
v. Carr, 247 F. Supp. 629 (M.D. Tenn. 1965) (approving the 1965 Tennessee Apportionment Act).
21. 256 F. Supp. at 827. Concurring, Judge Miller felt that the legislative-administrative dichotomy is immaterial so long as a subordinate body is vested with significant
and important powers of government, and is chosen by popular vote. 256 F. Supp.
at 826.
22. Circuit Judge of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals sitting as district judge by
designation.
23. Citing Taylor v. Taylor, 189 Tenn. 81, 222 S.W.2d 372 (1949).
24. 256 F. Supp. at 837. The dissenting opinion relies upon Glass v. Hancock
County Election Comm'n, 250 Miss. 40, 156 So. 2d 825 (1963), appeal dismissed,
378 U.S. 558 (1964) (per curiam); and Tedesco v. Board of Supervisors of Elections,
43 So. 2d 514 (La. App. 1949) (residents of certain districts of New Orleans charged
that lack of equal representation on city council violated fifteenth amendment), appeal
dismissed, 339 U.S. 940 (1950) (per curiam) ("for want of a substantial federal
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The reasoning of Judge Gray in the instant case is consistent with
the majority of courts which have considered the issue. There is
language in Reynolds which would indicate that the Supreme Court
considers equal representation and participation in the governmental
process an "inalienable right" which extends to every level of representative government, and it is thus conceivable that Reynolds can
be applied mechanically to every representative governmental unit.
On the other hand, even if the Reynolds holding is narrowly construed
to include only the legislature, the vital importance of public education in the community coupled with the influence of local school
boards could justify the application of Reynolds in order to bring at
least these units within the ambit of the "one man-one vote" principle.
Judge Phillips' suggestion that the court determine the primary nature
of a board's functions, while appealing in its simplicity, is subject to
criticism. A clearly defined administrative-legislative dichotomy is
illusory when applied to local school boards which often exercise dual
functions. By attempting to isolate and define each of the numerous
functions of such boards, courts would probably be forced to rely
heavily on a process of 'labeling" rather than on an analysis of the
total effect of these boards in light of the constitutional requirement of
equal protection. Regardless of the legal theories involved, both the
majority and the dissent recognized that there are practical reasons
why courts should abstain from ruling on local apportionment cases
until the newly apportioned legislatures have been given an opportunity to correct existing malapportionment. 26 For example, such premature behavior would, in effect, be tantamount to a court's exercise of
supervisory authority over legislative functions by specifying necessary
legislation and compelling the legislature to act.27
One of the most important problems inherent in the application of
Reynolds to local representative bodies such as school boards is the
question"). However, both of these cases are readily distinguishable. In Glass, the
court denied injunctive relief on the basis that a statutory procedure for re-districting
provided an adequate remedy at law. Tedesco was decided in 1950 when the Supreme
Court considered such questions non-justiciable. In fact, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
234, 249 (1962) (concurring opinions) would indicate that per curiam decisions decided
prior to Baker v. Carr have no more effect.
25. "But representative government is in essence self-government through the
medium of elected representatives of the people, and each and every citizen has an
inalienable right to full and effective participation in the political processes of his
State's legislative bodies." Reynolds v. Sims, supra note 4, at 565. (Emphasis added.)
"Diluting the weight of votes because of place of residence impairs basic constitutional
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment just as much as invidious discriminations
based upon factors such as race . . . or economic status .... ." Id. at 566.
26. See also Note, Reapportionment, 79 HARv.L. Rv. 1226, 1273 (1966). This note
contains an excellent survey of the problems inherent in sub-state apportionment.
27. See BicK=L, Tim LEAST DANGERous BRANCH 189-98 (1962). See also BicKEL,
op cit. supra at 247-54 for an analogous discussion of the Court's role in the school
desegregation decisions.
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difficulty in judicial administration. The school board is the most
common form of governmental unit in the United States, numbering
over 34,000, most of which are popularly elected. 9 The question
immediately arises as to what standards the legislatures are to apply
in arriving at an apportionment scheme which will be acceptable to
the numerous courts considering these cases. 3° Although Reynolds
provides that population is the controlling criterion, 31 other important
factors will have to be considered in arriving at a statewide plan.32
Thus it becomes possible that courts in different sections of the state
will disagree as to the validity of the plan, and such judicial uncertainty could convince the legislature to make the membership on these
bodies appointive or to create fewer districts through widespread
consolidation. Although other techniques for equalizing voting power
without changing the existing structure have been proposed, such as
elections at large, multi-member districts, and weighted voting, all
have been criticized, 33 and permanent weighted voting has been
declared unconstitutional.34 The Supreme Court apparently has recognized the problems created by the extension of the "one man-one vote"
standard to local representative units and has granted review to three
cases which involve this issueP 5
28. Note, supra note 26, at 1275 n.28, citing U.S. ADvisoay Comam'N
LOCAL

GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, PERFORmANCE OF URBAN FUNInONS:

ON INTERAND Ar-A-

WIDE 78 (1963).
29. U.S. DEr'T OF COMMERCE, BuREAU OF T
CENsus, 1966 STATISTICAL AnsTRACT
OF TnE UN=TED STAa-s 416. The following is a breakdown of local representative

governmental units potentially affected by the extension of Reynolds: 34,678 school
districts, 18,323 special districts, 18,000 municipalities, 17,142 townships and 3,043
counties.
30. See Note, supra note 26, at 1275-78.
31. Reynolds v. Sims, supranote 4, at 567.
32. In Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 60 Cal. 2d 318, 33 Cal. Rptr. 101, 384 P.2d
421 (1963), the court construed a statute which stated that districts should be as
nearly equal in population as possible; however, the board could consider such factors
as topography, geography, cohesiveness, contiguity, integrity, compactness of territory
and community of interests of the districts.
33. Elections at large tend to reduce the voter's identity with his government and
local representative and may effectively deny him any representation where the area
is controlled by a large community. Multi-member districts tend to destroy the effectiveness and efficiency of representative boards, such as a school board, since the increased
number of representatives renders these bodies too large and unwieldy. See Weinstein,
supranote 15, at 40-49.
34. Morris v. Board of Supervisors, 50 Misc. 2d. 929, 273 N.Y.S.2d 453 (Sup. Ct.
1966). See also WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 238 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)
(dictum).
35. Moody v. Flowers, supra note 14; Sailors v. Board of Educ., supra note 14;
Suffolk County Bd. of Supervisors v. Bianchi, 256 F. Supp. 617 (E.D.N.Y. 1966),
prob. juris, noted, 385 U.S. 966 (1966).

1967 ]

RECENT CASES

Criminal Law-Admissibility in Evidence of Blood
Tests Over Defendant's Objection
Defendant was involved in an auto accident. A police officer at
the scene thought he detected signs of drunkenness;' and when he
observed the same symptoms two hours later at the hospital, the
officer placed defendant under arrest, permitted him to consult counsel,
and, over his objections, instructed a physician to take a blood sample
for analysis of alcohol content. The results of the test were admitted
into evidence and defendant was convicted in the trial court of driving
under the influence of alcohol. Defendant appealed on the ground
that admission of the results of the blood test violated his constitutional rights. 2 The conviction was upheld by the California Superior
Court, and on certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held,
affirmed. A blood test taken in a reasonable manner over the objections of the defendant violates neither due process of law, the privilege
against self-incrimination nor the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable search and seizure. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757 (1966).
The constitutionality of blood tests taken without consent was first
presented to the Supreme Court in Breithaupt v. Abram.3 The facts
were substantially the same as those in the instant case,4 but at the
time, the Supreme Court had ruled that the federal exclusionary rules
of the fourth and fifth amendments were not applicable to state prosecutions. 5 Consequently, Breithaupt involved only the question of
whether the defendant had been denied due process of law under
the fourteenth amendment, as that phrase has been defined in Rochin
v. California.6 Since the acts in Breithaupt were not so "brutal and
1. The officer testified that he smelled liquor on petitioner's breath and that his eyes
were bloodshot, watery and glassy.
2. U. S. CONST. amend. IV: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons
. . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... ." U.S.
CONST. amend. V: "No person . ..shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right ...to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: ". . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law ...."
3. 352 U.S. 432 (1957), 11 VAND. L. REv. 196 (1957). For a discussion of cases
before Breithaupt see INBAU, SEL-F-INcRmIATI---rAT CAN AN AccusaD PERSON
BE COMPELED To Do? 72-82 (1950). Post-Breithaupt cases are discussed in 17
HASTI GS L.J. 139 (1965).
4. The basic factual distinction is that Breithaupt was unconscious when the blood
was taken.
5. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (fifth amendment); Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25 (1949) (fourth amendment).
6. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). Police officers broke into defendant's room and wrestled with
him in an unsuccessful attempt to get narcotics which defendant had swallowed. They
took defendant to a hospital where a tube was forced down his throat causing him to
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offensive"7 as to "shock the conscience"8 of the Court they did not

satisfy the test set forth in Rochin for establishing a violation of the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Subsequent to

this decision, the privileges of both the fourth and fifth amendment
were extended to state prosecutions through the due process clause

of the fourteenth amendment. In 1961, in Mapp v. Ohio,9 the Supreme
Court incorporated the privilege against unreasonable search and

seizure. Since it is uniformly held that a blood test is a search within
the meaning of the fourth amendment, the only problem arising in
this area concerns a determination of whether such tests are "unrea-

sonable," particularly in light of the fact that they are frequently

administered in the absence of a search warrant. Speaking generally,

it appears that where the blood test has been administered incident to
arrest, 10 or where a sample has been taken under exceptional circum-

stances such as to preserve evidence even absent an arrest," it will
come within two well-recognized Supreme Court exceptions to the

warrant requirements, 12 and will not be considered "unreasonable."

Three years after Mapp, in Malloy v. Hogan, 3 the Supreme Court
made a similar incorporation of the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination into the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-

ment. The historical foundations of the fifth amendment 14 have led the

great majority of courts to confine this privilege to evidence of a
vomit the capsules of heroin. The Court held these actions to be shocking to the
conscience and a denial of due process of law as guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment.
7. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 435 (1957).
8. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
9. 367 U.S. 642 (1961).
10. People v. Duroncelay, 48 Cal. 2d 766, 312 P.2d 690 (1957). The court found
a blood test to be reasonable on this basis even though the arrest followed the test.
See also State v. Kroening, 274 Wis. 266, 79 N.W.2d 810 (1956), where a blood test
was held to be unreasonable because the arrest came nine days after the sample was
taken.
11. People v. Huber, 232 Cal. App. 2d 663, 43 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1965).
12. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). A search made incident to a
lawful arrest may be made without a warrant. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10
(1948). The Court held that a search may be made without a warrant under exceptional circumstances. See also Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), where officers were
justified by exceptional circumstances in entering defendant's apartment without first
announcing themselves because of their belief that narcotics were being destroyed.
13. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
14. The privilege against self-incrimination is not a natural right of man and is
not recognized in many societies. It has evolved in Anglo-American law as a reaction
to the inquisitional procedure of the High Commission and Star Chamber in their
attempts to punish heresy and sedition. From here it moved slowly until the early
1700's when the principle became accepted that both parties and witnesses would
be privileged against compulsion to testify to facts subjecting them to punishment or
forfeiture. McCoRNMuc, EvmxEcE § 120 (1954); 8 WIGMORE, EVMENCE § 225 (McNaughton ed. 1961).
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communicative or testimonial nature. 1 5 The Supreme Court recognized this limitation in Holt v. United'States,16 where Mr. Justice
Holmes stated that, "the prohibition... is... of the use of physical
or moral compulsion to extort communications from . . . [the defendant], not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be
7
material."
In the instant case, the Court held that since defendant was unable
to distinguish his case from Breithaupt,8 he had not been denied
due process of law under the fourteenth amendment. His contention
that his privilege against self-incrimination had been violated was
also rejected, since the privilege was found to extend only to evidence
of a "testimonial" or "communicative" nature. Quoting Miranda v.
Arizona, 9 the Court recognized that the full scope of the privilege
requires "the government 'to shoulder the entire load' ... to respect
the inviolability of the human personality" and to "produce the evidence against... [the defendant] by its own independent labors... ;20
but it felt constrained by practicality to follow the great weight of
history and precedent which limited the privilege to evidence obtained
through "the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from .. . [the
defendant's] own mouth."21 The Court also rejected defendant's argument that his right to counsel had been violated. Since defendant was
not entitled to refuse the test, he had no greater right because counsel
advised him not to consent. Finally, the Court ruled that while the
blood test was a search and seizure, the fourth amendment had not
been violated because the search was not an unreasonable one. In
considering reasonableness the Court pointed out that because of the
peculiar characteristics of intrusions upon the human body it was
"writing on a clean slate" with regard to the previously established
rules for determining reasonableness.22 The Court then established the
reasonableness of the test upon the three grounds that it was incident
to an arrest by an officer who had reason to believe that evidence
15. 8 WIGmorE, EvmENcE § 2263 (McNaughten ed. 1961).

16. 218 U.S. 245 (1910). The prisoner was forced to put on a blouse to see if it
fit him.
17. Id. at 252-53.
18. The Court failed, however, to explain the footnote in Breithaupt indicating
that it might be reasonable to assume defendant would have consented had he been
conscious. Breithaupt v. Abram, supra note 7, at 435 n.2.
19. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
20. Id. at 460.
21. ibid.
22. The Court cites the source of many of these rules at 384 U.S. at 768 nn.10 &
11. One particular rule which was thought to have given the Court some problem if

they chose to recognize it requires that articles seized be either "fruits" or "instruments"
of the crime. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154 (1947). Of course, if the
Court had chosen to recognize this as a rule they could have stretched it by saying
that the alcohol found in the blood was an instrument of the crime.
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was being destroyed, that it )yas a common medical practice involving
little risk or pain, and that it was conducted by a physician in a
hospital environment.23 Four Justices dissented from the majority
opinion on various grounds.2 A
The apparent significance of Schmerber is that it resolves the ques-

tion, left open by Breithaupt, of the effect of the fourth and fifth
amendment upon involuntary blood tests. The result may shock many
who are familiar with the recent Supreme Court decisions greatly
modifying the structure of police practices. Perhaps in this respect the
decision implies that the Supreme Court has reached a temporary

equilibrium in its attempt to balance the rights of the accused individual against the needs of law enforcement agencies. This may be the
immediate underlying reason for the Court's willingness to limit the
scope of self-incrimination to communicative acts, even though the

historical development of the privilege was given as the primary
justification. But this history is one which dates back to a time when

most evidence was by oath and blood tests were nonexistent. Some
might argue that the privilege was so limited because through coercion

a man can be made to say what he does not mean, but this does
not explain holdings like Boyd v. United States,2 which applied the
privilege to communications in their permanent state, i.e., personal
papers. Viewing the amendment liberally, the test would be not

whether the evidence was communicative, but whether compulsion
was employed in procuring it.2 6 To follow this view, however, might
upset the balance against the needs of law enforcement. In particular

it would curtail the use of the widely employed police practice of

taking blood to determine intoxication z 7 and might also lead to applica23. The Court placed great emphasis on these facts and made no indication of what
the result might be if these conditions were varied. 384 U.S. at 772.
24. Mr. Justice Black believed the majority erred in its interpretation of the fifth
amendment. Citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), where the privilege
was held to extend to personal papers, he said, "It is a strange hierarchy of values that
allows the State to extract a human being's blood to convict him of a crime because
of the blood's content but proscribes compelled production of his lifeless papers."
384 U.S. at 775. Mr. Justice Douglas added that the taking of defendant's blood
without his consent violated the right to privacy as recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Mr. Justice Fortas felt the taking of blood over tie
protest of defendant was an act of violence, and was as much a violation of duo
process as the physical violence employed in Rochin.
25. Supranote 24.
26. This theory has received limited support. See, e.g., Breithaupt v. Abram, su pra
note 7, at 443-44 (dissenting opinion); Rochin v. California, supra note 8, at 175
(concurring opinion); State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91 N.W. 935 (1902) (rape:
compulsory examination by doctor for venereal disease); State v. Newcomb, 220 Mo.
54, 119 S.W. 405 (1909).
27. Forty-seven states have accepted the police use of blood tests either judicially or
by statute. The statutes are listed in 18 WASH. & LEE. L. REv. 370, 377-78 (1961). Ten
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tion of the privilege to such activities as fingerprinting and photographing of suspects.28 Schmerber is the first treatment by the
Supreme Court of the relationship of the fourth amendment to compulsory blood tests and intrusions upon the body in general and
several important factors deserve consideration. First, a search is no
longer sufficiently justified merely because it is made incident to an
arrest, although an arrest was present in the instant case. However, a
search without a warrant may still be constitutional if the officer has
probable cause to believe that evidence will be found, and if he is
faced with the immediate destruction of the evidence. 29 In such a
situation the individual would be freed of the technicality of an arrest.
Second, even though the search without a warrant is permitted the
method and manner of the search must be examined to determine its
reasonableness, and only a case-by-case approach will reveal what
will satisfy this standard. The blood test in the instant case was
found to be a reasonable method because it was commonplace,
involved little pain or risk, and its results were reliable, but the
question remains as to how these elements are to be balanced. For
example, the results of a stomach pump may be reliable, but on the
basis of individual sensitivities it may be found to involve more pain
than a blood test, and would not be considered a commonplace
occurrance. Is such a search reasonable? 30 In determining the reasonableness of the manner in which the test is performed the Court
recognized the problems that might arise from varying fact situations.
In addition, there is no indication that in assessing the manner in
which the test is performed the Court will take cognizance of the
force employed or that it will examine the acts taking place before
the test. This raises the question of the continued vitality of Rochin,
which spoke in terms of due process. If the courts take into consideration acts occurring prior to the search as bearing upon the reasonableness of the search, there would seem to be no need to speak in
terms of due process and what is shocking to the conscience. However,
states have attempted to avoid the problem of compulsion by enacting implied consent
statutes calling for revocation of drivers' licenses for refusal to submit to a chdmical
test. 18 Wyo. L.J. 252, 257 n.35 (1964).
28. Both practices have met with general approval; see 8 Wirmor, EVMENCE §
2265 n.2 (McNaughton ed. 1961).
29. This was the approach of the California court in People v. Huber, supra note 11,
where there was no arrest.
30. The same week the decision in the instant case was announced, the Ninth Circuit
held that the use of a stomach pump was reasonable as a medically approved method
of search. The court distinguished the case from Rochin on the basis that there was
no violence employed and that it involved a border search. Bletare v. United States,
362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966). This case may indicate a withdrawal from Rochin.
Although the fact that it was a border search is significant in establishing probable
cause for the search, this alone should not affect the standard of reasonableness to be
applied to the search.
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whether the rule is spoken of in terms of "shocking to the conscience"
or unreasonableness of the search, the question remains as to why
Rochin was permitted to go free because he chose to resist violently
while the convictions of Breithaupt and Schmerber were affirmed
because Breithaupt was unable to resist and Schmerber, through fear,
chose not to do so.31

Criminal Law-Resentencing-Court Has Duty
To Make Known Reasons for Increased Sentence
Defendant was convicted of armed robbery in 1960 and sentenced
to twenty years imprisonment. In 1964, defendant applied for postconviction relief under the appropriate North Carolina statute1 and
was awarded a new trial.2 On retrial defendant was sentenced to a
new twenty-year term, thereby delaying his eligibility for parole from
1965 to 1970, and his unconditional release from 1980 to 1985. Defendant contended that the denial of credit for time previously served
was violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution, and that the sentence on a second trial of the same
charge cannot exceed the penalty imposed after the first trial. On
petition to a federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus 3 to
reduce the sentence, held, granted. Arbitrary denial of credit at the
second trial for time served is so fundamentally unfair as to constitute
a violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the
fourteenth amendment, and the imposition of a harsher penalty without proper justification is an unconstitutional infringement on the
right to appeal. Patton v. North Carolina,256 F. Supp. 225 (W.D.N.C.
1966).
Not infrequently a prisoner who is successful in obtaining a retrial of
his case is resentenced in a manner that deprives him of all benefits
31. The point was raised in Mr. Chief Justice Warren's dissent in Breithaupt v.
Abram, supra note 7, at 441.
1. N.C. GEr. STAT. §§ 15-217 to 15-222 (1965), provides for review of constitutional
questions and is distinguished from state habeas corpus proceedings. North Carolina
also provides for a direct appeal.
2. Patton obtained a new trial because he had been denied the assistance of counsel
at his first trial.
3. Jurisdiction was exercised in this case despite the fact that defendant had not
exhausted state remedies. Exhaustion of state remedies is not a prerequisite to federal
habeas corpus jurisdiction if the result in state courts is a foregone conclusion. Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). There the court excused petitioner's failure to exhaust
state remedies because of his well-founded fear of receiving an increase from life
imprisonment to the death penalty in the event of a retrial.
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acquired by having served a portion of the first sentence. 4 Thus, he
may lose his "good and honor" time, thereby effectively increasing
his sentence, and he may delay his eligibility for parole. Since it is
unconstitutional to penalize a prisoner for seeking post-conviction
relief,5 two rationales are used to justify the imposition of a harsher
sentence on retrial.6 The first is that since a fundamental error in
any trial renders its conviction void, the second sentencing court is
not obligated to consider any time served under the previous sentence
in deciding the penalty. Following this view, North Carolina upheld
the imposition of a harsher sentence on retrial, finding the second
trial to be a retrial of the whole case, including verdict, judgment,
and sentence. 7 The increased penalty was held to be one of defendant's
risks in seeking a new trial.8 A second theory which permits the same
result is the doctrine of waiver.9 By seeking post-conviction relief a
defendant is said to waive any benefit he may have received under the
prior sentence, including a lighter sentence and credit due for time
served. 10 Although commentators have severely criticized the waiver
4. See Van Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake: Harsher Penalties and the "Successful"
Criminal Appellant, 74 YALE L.J. 606 (1965). See also Note, 1965 DvxE L.J. 395,
containing an informal survey showing the high incidence of increased sentences after
a second trial in North Carolina.
5. United States v. Boyce, 352 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1965); United States v. Wiley,
278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1960); State v. White, 262 N.C. 52, 136 S.E.2d 205 (1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1005 (1965); State v. Patton, 221 N.C. 117, 19 S.E.2d 142
(1942).
6. See Agata, Time Served Under a Reversed Sentence or Conviction-A Proposal
and a Basis for Decision, 25 MoNT. L. REV. 3, 36 (1963).
7. State v. White, supra note 5. North Carolina permits any increase in sentence,
without justification, subject only to the restriction that the increased sentence, when
added to the time previously served, does not exceed the maximum allowed for the
crime. Although this seems to allow credit for the time served, credit can effectively
be denied where the second sentence is greater than the first but less than the
maximum. Only where the maximum was imposed at the first trial is credit insured at
the second. Using the nullity of the previous trial as a justification for sentencing
discretion misapplies the void doctrine. The doctrine originated as the only means by
which courts could exercise jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings. Ex parte Watkins,
28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 191, 202-03 (1830) contains perhaps the first statement that all
previous proceedings are an absolute nullity.
8. But see Lewis v. Commonwealth, 329 Mass. 445, 447-48, 108 N.E.2d 922, 923
(1952), a minority view that allows credit, even without statutory authorization, on
the ground that "glaring and intolerable injustice would result if the time served on
a first sentence should not be taken into account in imposing a second sentence."
Compare Ex parte Wilkerson, 76 Okla. Crim. 204, 135 P.2d 507 (1945). There is no
constitutional requirement that credit be allowed. State v. Williams, 261 N.C. 172,
134 S.E.2d 163 (1964) (per curiam). Defendant received two-year sentence at first
trial, ten-year sentence at second trial. The court said defendant "took the risk."
9. For a discussion of the "waiver" and "void" theories of previous sentences, see
Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at 610, and Note, supranote 4.
10. The general justification given is that the defendant must accept the hazards of
a new trial as well as its benefits. Hobbs v. State, 231 Md. 533, 191 A.2d 238, cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 914 (1963). There is a split of authority on this position. See 5
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and nullity theories as illogical and unfair," the majority of American
courts still accept these rationales to permit increased sentences on
appealed cases. The United States Supreme Court held, however,
in Green v. United States,12 that an increased sentence would constitute double jeopardy where it resulted from an increase in the
degree of the crime charged at the second trial. Faced with facts
similar to those in Green, the California Supreme Court13 reversed on
narrow double jeopardy grounds, but indicated that emphasis is more
properly placed on the need for protection of post-conviction remedies.' 4
The court in the instant case was primarily concerned with the
fundamental unfairness of arbitrarily increasing punishment after a
new trial. While acknowledging the difficulty of trying to discover
and evaluate the motives of the trial judge, the court nevertheless felt
constrained to require that some rational reason for the punishment
be apparent on the record. Barring such an explanation the only
apparent reason for the decision was to punish the defendant for
appealing. The court shifted the burden to the state to establish on
the record a rational justification for a harsher sentence, whether affected by a denial of credit for time served or an absolute increase
in the sentence. The court refused to apply the "Waiver" or "nullity"
doctrines and also repudiated the rationale previously accepted by
North Carolina courts, that is, where the sum of the time served and
the new sentence is less than the maximum statutory penalty, a
presumption exists that credit for the time served was in fact given.15
WmmToN, Cau, NAL LAw AND PRocEDuRE § 2216 (1957).

Compare King v. United

States, 98 F.2d 291 (D.C. Cir. 1938), with Short v. United States, 344 F.2d 550 (D.C.
Cir. 1965).
11. "Where one 'waives' the effect of the first trial and 'consents' to a new trial he
does so only because the law imposes this as a consideration of setting aside the
conviction. To say that the defendant has waived all consequences of the first
conviction is to say that he served no sentence, but merely spent time in jail. Such a
characterization penalizes a defendant even though it was the state's deficiency which
necessitated the new trial." Note, supra note 4, at 402-03. See also, Whalen, Resentence
Without Credit for Time Served: Unequal Protection of the Laws, 35 Mn N. L. lEv.
239 (1951). In England, under the Criminal Appeal Act, 1964, 12 & 13 Eliz. 2, c. 143,
the law provides that upon reconviction no sentence greater than the original may be
given, and that the new sentence shall be dated back to the commencement of the
old.
12. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
13. People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 35 Cal. Bptr. 77, 386 P.2d 677 (1963).
The defendant received the death penalty at the second trial and a life sentence at the
first. The court held that the first sentence automatically barred a more severe sentence
on retrial.
14. "Since the state has no interest in preserving erroneous judgments, it has no
interest in foreclosing appeals therefrom by imposing unreasonable conditions on the
right to appeal." Id. at 497, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 86, 386 P.2d at 686.
15. State v. Weaver, 264 N.C. 681, 142 S.E.2d 633 (1965). The court had dflllculty
reconciling language in Weaver stating that "intolerable injustice" results from a denial
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If the state failed to maintain its burden, the new sentence was
voidable to the extent of the increased punishment.
Since "due process of law" includes the fair and equitable treatment
of defendants, it can be argued that an arbitrary increase in sentence
after appeal and reconviction is highly questionable. Unless factors are
present at the second trial which were not present at the first (e.g.,
knowledge of the defendant's past record or evidence that the defendant cannot be rehabilitated) it is possible to interpret a harsher
sentence on retrial as a punishment for having appealed. Courts which
hold that a defendant risks a greater sentence when he appeals 6 in
effect challenge prisoners to gamble benefits received under a prior
sentence against the possibility of complete release. 17 While increased
sentences may prevent the filing of frivolous appeals, this hardly
justifies discouraging appeals by convicts seeking relief from errors of
the lower court. There is no reason to demand that there be a
"waiver" of benefits as a condition to obtaining a corrective trial, and
it is unrealistic to say that under a "void" sentence time served in
prison was not actually served at all. There are times when an
increased sentence may be justifiable, and the restrictive effect such a
sentence might have on the right to appeal must necessarily be subordinated to the public interest served by such increases. But the
fundamental unfairness of effectively conditioning appeals by arbitrarily increasing sentences should be recognized. Hopefully, the
requirement that there be a rational reason for an increased sentence
will provide a standard that will be consistent with the exercise of
the constitutional right to appeal. However, there is a distinct possibility that those courts which now permit the imposition of a
harsher sentence on retrial will have little difficulty continuing this
policy under the vague "rational reasons" test. Patton does not say
there is an absolute constitutional right to credit for time previously
served, but to the extent that harsher sentences may now be subject
to the limitations imposed by due process, criminal appellants have
been afforded a new measure of protection.
While there can be little disagreement that requiring a defendant to
choose between the freedom possible by appeal and the prospect of
increased punishment in the event of reconviction is offensive to
of credit, with the result in the instant case. Weaver was interpreted to establish a
presumption that where a sentence less than maximum is passed on retrial, credit has
been given. See discussion, note 7 supra.
16. State v. White, supranote 5.
17. "[T]he pressure to relinquish post-conviction remedies will be strongest . . .

for those who have already served a substantial time . . . and for whom even a
small risk of being convicted again-with its concomitant risk of a substantial increase
in the sentence, and the loss of credit for time previously served and of good conduct
points-would appear unreasonable." Van Alstyne, supranote 4, at 623.
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general concepts of fairness, it is not so certain that all courts would
classify increased sentences given without "rational reasons" as so
fundamentally unfair as to invoke the protection of the due process
clause.' a By placing the right to justification on a constitutional plane,
the court in Patton has raised several difficult questions. If a defendant is now constitutionally entitled to rational reasons for his increased
sentence on retrial, it logically follows that he may also require that
valid reasons be given for his sentence at the initial trial. 19 Moreover,
if the reasons given for increased sentences are to be subject to review
under the fundamental fairness test, it may well follow that the state
2
should be given equally rational reasons for decreases in penalty.
Finally, if the absence of judicial justification for increasing sentences
places so great a burden on the defendant that his dilemma sufficiently
"shocks the judicial conscience" so as to require constitutional protection, the basic practice of placing sentencing discretion in the trial
judge may itself be subject to attack. Thus, while the result in the
instant case may be desirable, its constitutional underpinnings pose
difficult problems with respect to the traditional discretion allowed
trial judges in the sentencing process.
18. In Shear v. Boles, 35 U.S.L. W= 2461 (N.D.W.Va. Feb. 3, 1967) a harsher
sentence on retrial was upheld in the absence of any showing that the increased sentence
was retributive. It should be noted that the burden of establishing improper judicial
motivation was on the defendant. While acknowledging that to place an appellant in a
dilemma was unconscionable, the court emphasized that it was also necessary to respect
the function of the sentencing judge. The court felt it "tenuous" to suggest that the
mere imposition of a more severe sentence, without more, was violative of the constitution.
19. Just as it was argued in the instant case that a defendant who wished to appeal
was placed in an uncomfortable dilemma, it could be argued that a defendant at his
initial trial is placed in a similar dilemma when he considers whether to plead guilty
or stand trial. What assurance, one might ask, does a defendant have that the trial
judge is not, upon conviction, punishing him for not pleading guilty? Why not require
rational justification at this level as well?
20. For instance, although somewhat an extreme example, where the defendant is
sentenced to twenty years at his first trial, serves five years before his second trial, and
is resentenced to a one year term.
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Implied Warranty-Liability of Immediate and Remote
Vendors for Product Defects Under Section 2-318
of the Uniform Commercial Code
Decedent was killed by the explosion of a steam vaporizer which
had been purchased from a druggist by decedent's aunt, who lived'
next door. Decedents administrator brought an action in assumpsit
for damages resulting from breach of implied warranty of merchantability.1 Named as defendants were the druggist, the distributor and
the manufacturer, all of whom demurred on the ground that decedant
was not in privity of contract with them as required in an action of
assumpsit. The trial court sustained the demurrers, holding that decedent was not within the scope of section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which extends the seller's warranties to "any natural
person who is in the family or household of his buyer."2 On appeal
to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, held, reversed as to the druggist,
affirmed as to the distributor and the manufacturer. Decedent was
a member of the buyer's "family" within section 2-318, but the action
in assumpsit will not lie against remote vendors without proof of
privity between the parties. Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d

320 (1966).
Privity of contract has traditionally been required in an action for
breach of implied warranty.3 This rule, based upon contract law,
treats the warranty as an element of the contract of sale which
1. The action was brought in two counts, one under the wrongful death statute
and the other under the survival statute. The count based on wrongful death was
dismissed on the authority of DiBelardino v. Lemmon Pharmacal, 416 Pa. 580, 208 A.2d
283 (1965), which held that an action under the wrongful death statute could be
brought only in trespass. The court distinguished an action based on the survival
statute, finding no statutory limitation on the form of that action. It noted that the
survival statute created no "new" cause of action but merely continued the decedent's right of action by allowing his representative to sue. Miller v. Preitz, 422
221 A.2d 320, 322 (1966). This view that an action under the
Pa. 383, wrongful death statute cannot be based on an implied warranty is- in line with the
majority. Paossnn, ToRTs 652 n.95 (3d ed. 1964). See, e.g., Sterling Aluminum
Prods. v. Shell Oil Co., 140 F.2d 801 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 761 (1944).
For a case applying the minority rule, see Greco v. S. S. Kresge Co., 277 N.Y. 26, 12
N.E.2d 557 (1938). A detailed treatment of the problem is found in Note, 51
IowA L. REv. 1010 (1966).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-318 (1954). The section reads: "A seller's warranty
whether express or implied extends to any natural person who is in the family or
household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect
that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured,
in person by breach of the warranty .. . ." Pennsylvania, on April 6, 1953, becamethe first state to adopt the Uniform Commercial Code. The UCO Reporting Servicelists 44 states and the District of Columbia as having enacted the Code. See 2 UCC
Smv. 88 (1965) for the trial court opinion in the instant case.
REPoRTm
3. See Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 43 (1961), for a listing of the cases requiring privityand the growing contrary authority.
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4
passes from the seller to the buyer as a part of the consideration.

The requirement of privity has gradually been eroded in cases in5
volving food aid other products for intimate bodily contact, and

the rapid growth of strict liability for all injuries resulting from defective products may have reduced the majority rule to minority

status.6 Strict liability has been imposed on two theories, indistinguishable in result and barely so in form. Some courts have totally eliminated the privity requirement in implied warranty actions, basing

their decision on public policy and the essential tort nature of the

action.7 Others have allowed recovery on the basis of strict liability
in tort, creating an independent action free of the technicalities

of the law of sales." Although the UCC followed the contract theory
of implied warranty, section 2-318 extended the seller's warranties to
the buyer's family, household, and guests who might reasonably be
expected to use the product. 9 The purpose of this extension was to
free these classes from the requirement of privity with the buyer's

vendor, 10 but the section was "not intended to enlarge or restrict the
developing case law on whether the seller's warranties, given to the
buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain.""

4. For a brief survey of the origin of the action for breach of implied warranty
in tort, its assimilation into the subsequent assumpsit action and its treatment as a
part of the law of sales and contracts, and the confusion of the courts today in designating the nature of the action, see PRossER, TORTS 651-54, 678-81; Prosser, The Assault
Upon the Citadel, 69 YAE L.J. 1099, 1124-34 (1960).
5. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, id. at 1103-12; Wade, Strict Tort Liability
of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 7 (1965).
6. See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MiNN. L. REv. 791, 794-97 (1966), for
his latest listing of the jurisdictions which have imposed strict liability for defective
products. Prosser's summary shows 24 jurisdictions adhering to strict liability for all
products, 6 by statute, with another 6 jurisdictions approaching acceptance of the
doctrine.
7. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Miller, 26 Conn. Supp. 142, 214 A.2d 694 (1965); Picker
X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 185 A.2d 919 (Munic. Ct. App. D.C. 1962);
Hill v. Harbor Steel & Supply Corp., 374 Mich. 194, 132 N.W.2d 54 (1965); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592
(1963); Brewer v. Oriard Powder Co.,

-

Wash.2d

.--- ,

401 P.2d 844 (1965).

8. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897
(1962); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 IlM. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Santor v.
A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
9. See note 2 supra for the text of the section. The warranties the buyer receives,
aside from the express warranties given by the seller, are the implied warranties of
title and merchantability and perhaps fitness for the particular purpose of the buyer.
See PRossER, TORrs 653. These warranties form §§ 2-312 to-315 of the UCC.
10. ALI, UCC § 2-318, comment 2.
11. ALI, UCC § 2-318, comment 3. Logically the exclusions limit the requirement
of horizontal privity (privity between seller and a third party related to buyer), and
the section is neutral as to vertical privity' (privity between manufacturer or remote
seller and subpurchaser). Thus the section controls the question of whether a third
party can recover from the immediate seller. Case law will determine whether a
third party may sue a remote seller. See Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel
Doctrines, 19 RuTGERs L. REv. 692, 697-98 (1965.), for a more detailed explanation
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There are few cases defining section 2-318's application to suits by
third parties against the buyer's immediate vendor since other con-

venient forms of action are available for damages caused by defective

products. 12 Pennsylvania courts have required privity where the plaintiff was a corporation which was the successor to the purchaser, 13 a
guest of the buyer's donee,'14 and an employee, 5 but have allowed
16

suit by an employee who purchased the product for his employer.

In determining the requirement of privity in an action against a
remote vendor (the question left to developing case law by section
2-318) Pennsylvania in Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp.17 adhered

to the waning majority view, and summarized the status of products
liability law in the state as requiring privity in all assumpsit actions

for breach 8 of implied warranty, except those involving food and
beverages.1

of the section on the basis of these two "types" of privity.

This declaration

of

neutrality in comment 3 to § 2-318 has been expressly relied on by some courts in
extending the third party's action to a remote seller. See, e.g., Picker X-Ray Corp. v.
General Motors Corp., supra note 7, at 922-23. In some jurisdictions § 2-318 was
altered to prevent the defense of privity where the seller might reasonably have expected the plaintiff to use the product. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (1965).
In California the section was omitted when the Code was enacted. Other jurisdictions
have not allowed the Code to prevent extension of strict liability. See notes 7 & 8
supra.
12. The action may be for negligence, or it may be based upon the doctrine of
strict liability. And in cases involving foods and other products designed for intimate
bodily contact, the privity requirement is widely relaxed, even where the theory of
the action is implied warranty. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
13. Facciolo Paving & Constr. Co. v. Road Mach., Inc., 8 Chest. 375 (C.P. Pa. 1959).
14. Wolovitz v. Falco Products Co. (C.P. Allegheny County, Pa. 1963), printed at
1 UCC REponTG SEarv. 135 (1965).

15. Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963). The
plaintiff was injured when a bottle of carbornated soda water purchased by his employer exploded near him while he was tending bar.
16. Yentzer v. Taylor Wine Co., 414 Pa. 272, 199 A.2d 463 (1964). Comment, 17
V-N. L. REv. 1537 (1964). The employee was injured when a bottle of wine
which he had purchased for his employer exploded while he was handling it.
17. Supra note 15.
18. In adhering to the majority rule, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied on
Loch v. Confair, 361 Pa. 158, 63 A.2d 24 (1949). The case is questionable as authority for the rule, since the issue was whether or not plaintiff had become a
"purchaser" of the product who could maintain an action under the Uniform Sales
Act. The question of privity between plaintiff and the remote vendor was not
specifically decided. Id. at 161-66, 63 A.2d at 26-27. The Pennsylvania Court in
Hochgertel also ignored the theory developed in the federal courts that privity'had
been obliterated in all implied warranty actions. The first statement of this theory
came in Mannsz v. MacWbyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946) (dictum). The
case cited the food cases and negligence actions as authority for its conclusion. Id. at
450. Main reliance seemed to be on language in the food and drug cases indicating
the action on an implied warranty was essentially a tort action. Id. at 452 n.13. A
federal district court following this authority cited Loch v. Confair as further support for the elimination of privity. Thompson v. Reedman, 199 F. Supp. 120, 12324 (E.D. Pa. 1961). See also Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156
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In deciding that decedent was a beneficiary within section 2-318
to whom the seller's warranties extended, the Pennsylvania court interpreted literally the words of the statute before it. Defendant's
contention that the words "family" and "household" are synonymous
was rejected. Rather the court construed the section to benefit three
classes-family, household, and guests-subject to the added condition
that it be reasonable to expect the individual plaintiff to use the product.19 Decedent was held to be within the buyer's "family;" and because of his geographical proximity to the purchaser, he might reasonably be expected to use the vaporizer. Although it found decedent
exempted from the requirement of privity in an action against the
immediate seller, the court refused to remove the privity requirement
in an action against the distributor and manufacturer. In so holding,
the court felt bound by the limitations imposed on strict liability in
assumpsit by section 2-31820 and by the statement of Pennsylvania
law in Hochgertel. The court recognized the policy considerations of
the developing law of strict liability as expressed in the Restatement
of Torts Second,21 but adhered to the contract concept of implied
warranty and refused to allow any further exceptions to the rule of
privity in assumpsit actions based on warranty. However, the court
explicitly did not preclude later consideration of the doctrine of strict
liability if an appropriate case should arise.
The inclusion of the decedent in the instant case within section
2-318 seems consistent with the intent of the draftsmen. Although
the infant was not a member of the buyer's immediate family, he was
a relative, and one who might reasonably be expected to use the
product. The Pennsylvania court had previously considered the much
closer question of whether an employee who purchased the product
for his employer was within the section,22 and the court's liberal construction there made the result in the instant case predictable. If
the decedent is allowed to recover from the immediate vendor without privity, however, familiar policy reasons suggest the removal of
A.2d 568 (1959), a decision by an intermediate state court which seems to be based
on the doctrine of strict liability, although containing language of a warranty created
by advertising.
19. See note 2 supra for the text of § 2-318. See also comment 2 to this section,
supra note 10 and accompanying text.
20. The court viewed the declaration of neutrality in comment 3 to § 2-318, supra
note 11 and accompanying text, as unauthoritative since the comment was not specifically
enacted by the legislature. 422 Pa. 383, -, 221 A.2d 320, 325. Prosser states that
Pennsylvania has been the only jurisdiction to view § 2-318 as a limitation on the
further elimination of privity. Prosser, supra note 6, at 799.
21. 422 Pa. 383, -,
221 A.2d 320, 325 (dictum). RESTATEMNT (Second) TOTS
§ 402A (1965), is the American Law Institute's enactment of the doctrine of strict
liability.
22. Yentzer v. Taylor Wine Co., supra note 16.
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that barrier in an action against the remote vendors.23 The instant
court's unwillingness to extend the application of section 2-318 to the
remote vendor, and its decision to await a more "appropriate" case to
consider the doctrine of strict liability, are the result of tenacious adherence to the strict contract nature of an implied warranty action,
a concept abandoned by Pennsylvania courts for food products, and
by an increasing number of other courts for all products.2 Yet the
court's refusal to remove the implied warranty action from contract
law may be justifiable if, in a future negligence case, it adopts strict
liability as an independent action, a distinct possibility in light of its
apparent sympathy with the doctrine. 25 Adoption of an independent
strict liability action in tort for injuries resulting from defective products would eliminate the confusion of tort and contract in actions

brought for breach of implied warranty. It would also have the effect
23. These include: (1) The fact that the manufacturing level is the occasion where
most defects are born, and the manufacturer should bear the cost of damages resulting
from such defects since the cost of liability insurance to him is considerably less than
the cost to the individual plaintiff. (2) The very nature of commerce which insulates
the manufacturer from the ultimate consumer by numerous middlemen and the unsuitability of the privity doctrine in such a situation; the duplication which successive
suits up the line of privity entails, and the possibility that a judgment proof middleman
may foil recovery.
24. The court's conclusion that precedent and § 2-318 bound it to the contract
theory of implied warranty as embodied in the majority rule was not inevitable. The
prior cases were susceptible of more than one interpretation, as evidenced by the
line of federal cases contrary to the instant rule. Supra note 18. In addition, Pennsylvania is the only jurisdiction which has construed § 2-318 to limit expansion of strict
liability in warranty actions. Supra note 20. Many of the jurisdictions adopting strict
liability have incorporated the doctrine into the action for breach of implied warranty.
See note 7 supra for exemplary cases. The bases for the elimination of privity in these
cases were policy and the recognition of the tort nature of the implied warranty action.
Other jurisdictions, which have adopted an independent doctrine of strict liability in
tort, promulgated the rule in an action based on an implied warranty. (Of the
exemplary cases cited in note 8 supra, all were introduced to the courts grounded in
whole or in part on an action for breach of implied warranty.) All the jurisdictions
listed in notes 7 & 8 supra have now adopted the code, although it was not in force
in all of them at the date of decision. See the UCC REPORTL'c SERvIcE, state correlation section for the state adoptions of the code.
25. Two strong dissents, joined by a third justice, lend support to this possibility.
422 Pa. 383, _ 221 A.2d 328, 335.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in an opinion handed down on the same date as
the instant case, did in fact adopt the Restatement doctrine of strict liability. Webb v.
Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966). In this case plaintiff, who was injured by
the explosion of a keg of beer, brought suit in trespass against the brewer, beer
distributor, and keg manufacturer based on the theory of exclusive control. The trial
court dismissed the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to join as
defendants his father (who purchased the keg) and his brother (who tapped it), thus
making his theory of recovery defective. On appeal the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
adopted § 402A of the Restatement of Torts Second, overturned the dismissals,
and remanded the case to allow plaintiff to amend his complaint to state a cause of
action in trespass for defective products liability.
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of limiting even further the scope and utility of section 2-318, a
result consistent with this trend toward recognizing products liability
as a tort concept free of the technicalities of the law of contracts.

Insurance-Deferred Annuity Policy Which
Guarantees Return of 100 Per Cent of Net
Premiums Not Subject to SEC Regulation
Defendant insurance company offered deferred annuity contracts1
which guaranteed the annuitant the return of at least 100 per cent 2

of his net premiums. 3 Any benefit payment above this assured

minimum was to vary directly with the value of the annuitant's pro
rata share of the profits resulting from the investment of a special
fund composed of premiums paid on such policies. The SEC sought to
enjoin the sale of defendant's contracts until the policies were registered as "securities" under the Securities Act of 19334 and until there
was a compliance with the Investment Company Act of 1940.5 The
defendant contended that since the company had assumed a substantial portion of the investment risk, the contracts qualified as "insur1. The policy was termed the Flexible Fund Annuity (hereinafter FFA). Under the
FFA contract the annuitant agreed to pay the insurance company specified monthly
premiums which were segregated into a special, separate account (Flexible Fund).
The policyholder then would be credited with his proportionate share of the profits
resulting from the investment of the money in the Flexible Fund. In order to
protect the annuitant from the vicissitudes of a "bear market," the company guaranteed
that at least 100% of the net premiums would remain in the account of the annuitant
during the deferred period. At the maturity of the policy, the policyholder could
withdraw the accumulated value of his policy in cash or apply this accumulated value
to a fixed annuity. At this point, the value of the policy became fixed, and the policyholder no longer shared in the investment profits made by the Flexible Fund.
2. The guarantee of 100% applied only if the deferred period were ten years or
longer. If the period were less than ten years, the guarantee ranged from 50% (first
year) to 90% (ninth year).
3. The court defines net premium as gross premium minus deductions for expenses.
SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 359 F.2d 619, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
4. 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1964). Section 77f requires a
company involved in the sale of securities in interstate commerce to file a registration
statement with the SEC describing the nature of the enterprise. Section 77i sets forth
the elements and the information required in a prospectus. The congressional purpose
behind the act is to apprise prospective buyers of the information relevant to risks that
may be involved.
5. 54 Stat. 789 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -24 (1964). Section 80a-8
requires the investment company to comply with provisions for registration and recital
of its. investment policies and operating practices. Also, a limited measure of regulation
of the investment policies and practices is provided.
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ance,"6 which is exempt by the McCarran-Ferguson Act7 from federal
regulation. The trial court entered judgment for the defendant, and
on appeal, held, affirmed. The guarantee of 100 per cent of net premiums is a sufficient assumption of the investment risk to exempt the
contract as "insurance" from federal securities regulation. SEC v.
United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 359 F.2d 619 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
Although the regulation of insurance is within the ambit of the

federal plenary power over interstate commerce,8 Congress has
expressly reserved the control of the insurance industry to the states.
This policy determination was enunciated in the McCarran-Ferguson
Act, which directed that no act of Congress shall be construed "to

invalidate, impair, or supersede" any state law relating to the regulation of insurance.9 Thus, while the Federal Securities Act and the
Federal Investment Company Act create a regulatory structure for
the sale of securities, 10 both acts specifically exclude insurance contracts from their coverage." Viewed as a whole, these three acts
create a dichotomy of regulation between the federal control of

securities on the one hand, and state control of insurance on the
other. During the 1950's, however, a new concept in insurance
emerged which did not fit neatly into this established dichotomy-the
variable annuity contract. 12 This type of policy differed from the
6. "[T]he concept of 'insurance' involves some investment risk-taking on the part of
the company. . . . "[I]nsurance" involves a guarantee that at least some fraction of
the benefits will be payable in fixed amounts." SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co.,
359 U.S. 65, 71 (1959) (hereinafter cited as VALIC).
7. 59 Stat. 33 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1964), which provides in
relevant part that: "(a) The business of insurance . .. shall be subject to the laws
of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business. (b)
No act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law
enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance . ..."
8. It was not until 1944 that this power was recognized. In-United States v. SouthEastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), the Court held that control of the
interstate insurance industry was within the scope of federal regulation under the
commerce clause.
9. 59 Stat. 33 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1964). See note 7 supra.
The McCarran-Ferguson Act was passed in quick response to South-Eastern Underwriters, the ostensible intent of Congress being to reject the exercise of their newlyacknowledged power and to allow the states to retain their individual controls over
the business of insurance.
10. See notes 4 & 5 supra.
11. "Any insurance or endowment policy or annuity contract . . . issued by a
corporation subject to the supervision of the insurance commissioner [of a State] ...."
is specifically excluded in the Securities Act of 1933, § 3(a)(8), 48 Stat. 76, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77c(a) (8) (1964). "Any bank or insurance company" is excluded in the Investment
Company Act of 1940, § 3(c)(3), 54 Stat. 798, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(3) (1964).
12. The first variable annuity, the College Retirement Equities Fund, was established
in 1952. See VALIC, supra note 6, at 69. "A variable annuity contract functi6ns in
the following manner: The purchaser acquires accumulation units in a fund. which
is invested in common stocks. To determine how much an accumulation unit will
cost, the total market value of the fund is divided by the number of outstanding units,
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traditional fixed annuity in that the annuitant's benefits were not a
fixed dollar amount, but rather a sum which varied with the success
of the invested premiums. Yet, the variable annuity retained many
of the insurance features of the classic fixed annuity, including in
particular the distribution of mortality risk. 13 Conceptually, therefore,
the variable annuity was a hybrid form, an amalgam of insurance and
security characteristics. Debate14 over whether this type of policy
was subject to federal regulation as a "security" or exempt from such
regulation as "insurance" was resolved by the Supreme Court in
SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co.15 (hereinafter referred to as
VALIC). Employing a conceptual approach,'16 the Court concluded
that since the policy guaranteed no fixed income and thus placed the
burden of 7risk upon the policyholder, the variable annuity was a
"security." In ascertaining the nature of the contract, the VALIC
just as the value of each share of an investment fund is computed by dividing the
total asset value of the fund by the number of outstanding shares. Usually the contract
holder will be investing a fied sum per year and the number of units he will buy
each year fluctuates with the price of the accumulation unit as it reflects changes in
the common stock fund. The units will accumulate over the years, and when the
policy holder retires and elects to take the variable annuity option as opposed to one
of the other options offered, his total accumulation units will be converted into an
annuity fund. To do this, the number of units he has accumulated will be multiplied
by the value of a unit at that time, giving a cash sum. Using this sum, the first annuity
payment is computed using the progressive annuity table and an interest rate ....
Comment, 12 VAND. L. REv. 1398 n.2 (1959). For a detailed comparison of the
variable annuity with the classic fixed annuity, see Mearns, The Commission, The
Variable Annuity, and The InconsiderateSovereign, 45 VA. L. llnv. 831, 833-37 (1959).
13. Other features include term life and disability insurance. For the argument that
a variable annuity is "insurance," see Day, A Variable Annuity is Not a "Security,"
32 No=E DANm LA-w. 642 (1957); Comment, 11 VA.-D. L. REv. 1453 (1958).
14. Compare Day, supra note 13, with Haussermann, The Security in Variable
Annuities, 1956 INs. L.J. 382. See Note, Variable Annuity: Security or Annuity?, 43
VA. L. REV. 699 (1957).
15. Supra note 6. The Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company was primarily
engaged in the sale of variable annuity contracts. The SEC sought injunctive relief
against the company until these contracts were registered under the Securities Act of
1933 and until there was a compliance with the Investment Company Act of 1940.
The SEC asserted that the contracts were securities and, therefore, subject to federal
regulation. The defendant argued that the policies were insurance contracts and
exempt from federal regulation by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The district court
dismissed the complaint, and the court of appeals affirmed. On certiorari to the
Supreme Court, held, reversed. Since the variable annuity contracts place all the
investment risks upon the annuitant, such contracts must be considered as securities and
within the scope of federal regulation. In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Brennan urged
that the contracts presented the type of regulatory problems that Congress intended to
solve by federal securities regulation. The dissent noted the historic policy of entrusting
the regulation of insurance to the states and concluded that this new experiment in
insurance should be regulated by the various local insurance boards.
16. This approach may be described as an attempt to determine the concept (i.e.,
"security" or "insurance") to which the policy most closely conformed.
17. "The difficulty is that, absent some guarantee of fixed income, the variable annuity places all the investment risks on the annuitant, none on the company." VALIC,
supra note 6, at 71.
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Court placed primary emphasis upon the determination of whether
there had been a substantial assumption of the investment risk by
the insurer. 8
In determining the amenability of the policy to federal regulation,
the court in the instant case was faced with essentially the same type
of problem as that presented in VALIC, i.e., characterization of an
annuity contract which combined features of both insurance contracts
and investment securities. Initially, the court noted the similarities between this new type of contract and the traditional deferred annuity,
i.e., both had such common characteristics of insurance as'the assumption of mortality and expense risks by the company and provisions
for cash surrender value and death benefits. The only significant
difference between the two types of policies was that the contract in
the instant case promised only a return of principal, rather than
assuring principal plus interest.19 Denying the SEC's contention that a
policy is not "insurance" unless it guarantees both principal and
interest, the court concluded that "by guaranteeing principal . . .
United has assumed a substantial part . . . [of the investment] risk
during the deferred period of the contract." 20 This assured return
provided "a substantial and meaningful 'floor' to the . . . policy"2 1
and distinguished it from the variable annuity contract which had
been declared a "security" in the VALIC decision.
The instant decision closely adheres to the logic of the approach
employed by the VALIC Court. This approach may be summarized
as an attempt to determine whether the policy is "insurance," and
therefore exempted from SEC regulation, by gauging the substantiality
of the issuer's assumption of the investment risk.22 If there is a sufficient guarantee of return, then the policy is an insurance contract
to be regulated solely by the states; if the issuer fails to assume a
substantial portion of the risk, the policy is a regulable security,
subject to SEC controls. On its face this technique appears to conform to the congressional intent as evidenced by the statutes previously
considered. In fact, however, it disregards the consideration that such
18. Id. at 71-73. This emphasis on the risk-taking aspect as determinative has been
followed by the SEC. See Prudential Ins. Co. of America, SEC Investment Co. Act
Release No. 3620, Jan. 22, 1963.
19. "The only meaningful difference between the FFA and the conventional deferred
annuity is that the FFA does not guarantee interest on the accumulation of net
premiums during the deferred period, but instead promises 100% of net premiums
plus a share in any profits made by the investment and reinvestment of the money in
the Flexible Fund," 359 F.2d at 622.
20. Id. at 623.
21. Ibid.
22. See Mearns, supra note 12, at 844-49. Professor Mearns .criticizes, this approach.
and suggests that the Court should have looked to, what, the-law ought to be, i.e.,
which governmental agency should regulate.
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contracts are really a mixture of investment securities and insurance
contracts, since despite the minimum return guaranteed the annuitant,
a substantial portion of the contract represents an investment in the
common-stock portfolio of the special fund. Although it seems rea-

sonable that the policyholder-investor should be entitled to the
investment regulation prescribed by Congress, the instant decision
appears to deny the annuitant the benefit of that special protection.
Furthermore, since the controls imposed by state insurance boards
are generally irrelevant to the regulation of investment policy and
operating practice,23 exclusive state regulation of such hybrid con-

tracts would preclude any meaningful control over the investment
aspects of the policy. Perhaps a better approach would have been
to regard the policyholder's, rather than the issuer's, assumption of the

investment risk as determinative of whether the contract was "insurance" for the purposes of exemption from SEC regulation. Thus, even

though the policy appears on its face to be an insurance contract, it
should be subject to SEC regulation if the policyholder has assumed
a significant measure of the investment risk. The consequences of
such an approach would be to assure a more comprehensive protection

of the public by effecting control of both the insurance and investment
features of the policy. Applying this test to the facts of the instant

case, it is submitted that since the policyholder had assumed a
significant measure of the investment risk, SEC regulation should have
been required.

Jurisdiction-"Minimum Contacts"-"Corporate Veil"
Pierced by Use of Tenuous Agency Relationship
The United States sued in a New York federal district court' to
recover delinquent income taxes from the estate of a Canadian domi-

ciliary. It alleged that the deceased taxpayer bad used his position
as manager of a Canadian distillery to direct American distributors to
23. The controls imposed by the state insurance boards are directed toward the
regulation of rates and other policy terms, reserves, solvency, and permissable investments. See VALIC, supra note 6, at 79. The controls imposed by the Securities Act of
1933 and the Investment Company Act of 1940 are directed primarily toward disclosure.
1. Jurisdiction was assumed over the taxpayer's executor pursuant to rule 4(e) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, incorporating § 302 of the New York Civil
Practice Laws and Rules. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e) provides in part: "Whenever a statute
or rule of court of the state in which the district court is held provides (1) for the
service of a summons . . . upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the
state . . . service may . . . be made under the circumstances prescribed in the
statute or rule." See note 24 infra.
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share their profits with the taxpayer's friends and relatives.2 The
government claimed such "commissions" were taxable income to the
taxpayer. 3 Pursuant to New York's "long-arm" 4 statute (hereinafter
referred to as Civ. Prac. § 302), 5 personal service of process was made
upon the defendant Canadian trust company, executor of taxpayer's

estate. The government contended that, since the distributors, as
personal agents of the taxpayer, drafted and executed the contract

directing payment of funds to the taxpayer's designees in the state of
New York, 6 there were sufficient local acts to render taxpayer's estate

amenable to New York jurisdiction. The trust company claimed
that service upon it was unauthorized since the taxpayer's corporate

activities did not constitute the transaction of personal "business" by
him within New York as required by the statute. The district court

accepted
this contention and dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdic7

tion. On appeal, held, reversed. Where a foreign corporation's nondomiciliary manager, acting through corporate contractual agents,
transacts any personal business in New York from which a cause of
action arises, New York has sufficient contacts to justify the assertion

of jurisdiction over his estate. United States v. Montreal Trust Co.,
358 F.2d 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 919 (1966).
Traditionally, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
required the physical presence of defendant within the forum state
2. More specifically the facts show that the exclusive world-wide agent for the
Canadian distillery of which deceased taxpayer was manager entered into a contract
with a New York corporation by which the New York corporation became the exclusive
sub-agent for the distribution of whiskey in the United States. Deceased taxpayer
insisted as a precondition to the making of the contract that the New York corporation
agree to put on its payroll as salesmen various relatives and friends of the deceased
taxpayer. There was evidence to show that the deceased taxpayer wrote to the New
York corporation's New York manager instructing him as to the method by which
his designees were to be paid. These instructions were followed and the designees
were paid in New York with funds drawn on a New York bank for doing little or
no work. The facts also show that a San Francisco distributor purchased whiskey from
the distillery for shipment to military bases. As a precondition to this contract, deceased
taxpayer insisted that the distributor pay two-thirds of his profit to deceased taxpayer's
brother-in-law in New York. While negotiations took place in Canada, the contract to
pay funds to deceased taxpayer's brother-in-law was drafted and executed in New
York.
3. Under the rule of attribution of income the payments received by designees may
be considered taxable income of the designor. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
4. The term "long-arm" is generally applied to statutes which grant jurisdiction over
parties not present in the geographical area of the state.
5. N.Y. Crv. PRc. § 302, Personal Jurisdiction by Acts of Non-domiciliaries, provides: "A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his
executor or administrator, as to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated
in this section . . . if, in person or through an agent, he: 1. transacts any business
within the state ......
6. As to these transactions, the taxpayer was never personally in New York and
allegedly acted at all times in his fiduciary capacity as manager of the corporation.
7. United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 235 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
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before a judgment binding him personally could be rendered. 8 However, the Supreme Court has gradually loosened this rather strict
jurisdictional requirement After finding that service of process need
only be "reasonably calculated to give the defendant actual notice

and opportunity to be heard" in order to satisfy due process require-

ments, the Supreme Court in InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington 0

held that judicial jurisdiction could exist if the defendant had sufficient
minimum contacts with the forum state such that the maintenance

of the suit would not offend "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.""1 Twelve years later, in McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co.,'2 the Supreme Court upheld in personam jurisdic-

tion under a "single act" statute where the lone contact with the
forum state was an isolated insurance contract. As a result of this
expansion in the permissible scope of jurisdiction over nonresidents,

many states enacted "single act" statutes enabling them to acquire
personal jurisdiction over nondomiciliaries sued on a cause of action

arising from single or occasional acts within the state.13 New York
joined this trend in 1963 by enacting Civ. Prac. § 302 which requires
that the defendant "transact business" within the state and that the
cause of action arise out of that transaction before jurisdiction can be
asserted over him. 4 In the broadest interpretation of this phrase to
8. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
9. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940). The trend toward expanded in
personam jurisdiction over nonresidents rests on the view that as the flow of interstate
travel has increased, the need for easily obtainable and inexpensive forums in which
to litigate actions arising out of the increased contact has similarly increased. Additionally, it would seem that each state has a right to protect its own citizens from
the actions of nonresidents. See generally Student Symposium of Jurisdiction and
Venue: A Reconsideration of Long Arm Jurisdiction, 37 IND. L.J. 333 (1962).
10. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
11. Id. at 316.
12. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
13. See ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 199(1) (Supp. 1965); Ax. STAT. ANN. § 27-2502
(Supp. 1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-411(c) (1961); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
47.16 (Supp. 1965); IDAno CODE ANN. § 5-514 (Supp. 1965); ILL. ANN. SWAT. cll.
110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1956); IowA CODE ANN. § 617.3 (Supp. 1965); KAN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-308(6) (1964); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13.3201 (Supp. 1965);
ME. REv. STAT. ANx. tit. 14, § 704 (1965); MD. ANN. CODE art. 75, § 96 (1965);
MicH. STAT. ANN. §§ 27A.701-735 (1962); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 303.13(1),(3)
(Supp. 1965); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 351.630(2), 355.375(2) (Supp. 1965); MONT. REv.
CODE ANN. ch. 2701, rule 4B (Supp. 1965); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-3-16 (Supp. 1965);
N.Y. Cxv. PnAc. § 302; N.C. GmN. STAT. § 55-145 (1965); Omo REV. CODE §§
2307.381-385 (Anderson 1965); OxI.LA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 187 (Supp. 1966);
One. flnv. S-tAT. § 14.035 (1963); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 9-5-33 (Supp. 1965);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-424 (Supp. 1965); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2031B (1964);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 855 (1959); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-81.1-5 (Supp. 1966);
WAsH. REv. CODE: ANN. § 4.28.185 (1962); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3083 (1961); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 262.05 (Supp. 1966).
14. See, e.g., Schneider v. J & C Carpet Co., 23 App. Div. 2d 103, 258 N.YS.2d
717 (1st Dep't 1965) (transacting business through performance in furtherance of
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date by New York courts, a foreign corporation was held to be
"transacting business" in New York on the basis of extensive negotia
tions in New York, the execution of a supplemental agreement there,
and the performance of a contract there under the supervision of the
defendant's representatives. 15 Generally, the New York courts seem to
require that three conditions be satisfied before upholding jurisdiction
asserted over a nondomiciliary on the basis of Civ. Prac. § 302. He
must have "transacted business" in New York in an individual capacity
rather than in a corporate capacity; 16 either he or his agent must be
physically present in New York with relation to that transaction; 17
and the transaction of business in New York must be purposefully
undertaken by him so that he may be said to have invoked the benefits
18
and protection of the laws of New York.
The majority in the instant case limited itself to the jurisdictional
issue and focused on whether the taxpayer had transacted "sufficient
business" in New York to subject the executor of his estate to New
York jurisdiction. It dealt with two interrelated problems: (1) whether
the taxpayer was acting in an individual capacity when he directed
that funds be diverted to his friends and relatives; and (2) whether,
since the taxpayer had never been in the state, his dealings with
New York distributors constituted a transaction of business there
within the meaning of the statute. The majority reasoned, without
further explanation, that on the findings of fact the taxpayer could not
have been acting in his corporate capacity when he allegedly directed
payments to his designees who had no connection with the corporation.
Thus, the court held that the taxpayer had engaged in activity within
New York in his individual9 capacity and was not protected by his
"role as corporate officer."' Turning next to the question of the
defendant's presence in the state, the court first held that the discontract).

New York courts have not yet extended jurisdiction over nondomiciliaries

to its outer limits; rather they have adopted a case-by-case approach, always watching

the experiences of other states in relation to their "long-arm" statutes. See Comment,
14 BUr-ALo L. REv.525, 539 (1965).
15. Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, 21 App. Div. 2d 474, 251
N.Y.S.2d 740 (1st Dep't 1964).
16. Boas & Associates v. Vernier, 22 App. Div. 2d 561, 257 N.Y.S.2d 487 (1st Dep't
1965) (action to recover commissions earned by business broker).
17. Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, supra note 15 (action
for breach of warranty in performance of contract); Iroquois Gas Corp. v. Collins, 42

Misc. 2d 632, 248 N.Y.S.2d 494 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (action for breach of construction
contract).
18. Schroeder.v. Loomis, 46 Misc. 2d 184, 259 N.Y.S.2d 42 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (products
liability); Lewin v. Boch Laundry Mach. Co., 42 Misc. 2d 599, 249 N.Y.S.2d 49
(Sup. Ct. 1964) (products liability).
19. 358 F.2d at 243.
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tributors served merely as personal agents of the taxpayer.2 0 Since
these agents established the necessary "contacts" 2' 1 with New York

when they negotiated and executed contracts there, the court concluded that the taxpayer had purposefully conducted activities in
New York, and his estate was, therefore, amenable to service of
process. The minority dissented on the ground that under well recog-

the distributors were clearly not the
nized principles of agency
22
taxpayer's personal agents.

The "long-arm" concept was initially intended to protect local
citizens from the intrastate activities of nondomiciliaries by extending
judicial jurisdiction to parties not present within the geographical area

of the state. In the instant case, the local activities of a nondomiciliary
were not relied upon to establish judicial jurisdiction for the purpose

of protecting a local interest, rather they were used to uphold judicial23
jurisdiction in a matter of national concern, i.e., federal taxation. It is
in this area that the instant case may have its most significant implications. Since no federal legislation granted jurisdiction, the circuit court
had to rely upon a tenuous agency relationship to establish the taxpayer's necessary connections with New York. In the absence of

a federal statute extending judicial jurisdiction to federal courts in
areas of federal concern,2

the approach of the instant case seems

20. The majority found that the district court erred in requiring the government to
go beyond the presentation of prima facie evidence to establish threshold jurisdiction.
The apparent willingness of the American distributors to comply with the taxpayer's
wishes in directing portions of their profits to the taxpayer's designees was considered
by the majority to indicate sufficient control to justify a finding that they were the
taxpayer's personal agents.
21. The minority urged that the majority confused the "doing business" test of
Civ. Prac. § 301 with the "transacting any business" test of Civ. Prac. § 302 by
referring to "contacts" to determine if the taxpayer transacted business. The test under
Civ. Prac. § 302 is not whether there are sufficient contacts, but whether the defendant
transacted any business in the state from which a cause of action arose.
22. The minority states: "[I] would agree with the conclusion reached by the
majority if I could accept its premise that Klein [taxpayer] was engaged in the
state through agents in the transacting of any business out of which the alleged cause
of action arises .

. .

. Upon that issue, accordingly, I respectfully but emphatically

dissent." 358 F.2d at 244. The assertion of jurisdiction based on such tenuous evidence,
the minority urged, violated the due process requirements of the United States Constitution, and will plague the bar with uncertainty until corrected.
23. The majority felt that since the jurisdictional issue of whether there was a
transaction of business in New York was so involved with the substantive issue of
tax liability, a proof of tax liability would necessarily prove the requisite jurisdictional
transactions. Therefore the establishment of "prima facie tax related transactions"
will be sufficient to invoke the New York "long-arm" statute and force the defendant
into a trial on the merits. For a more detailed discussion of this point see Comment,
42 No=E DAmE LAW. 273 (1966).
24. Professors von Mehren and Trautman suggest that this case is, on the federal
level, an analogue to International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra note 10. As in International Shoe, the assertion of federal jurisdiction in the instant case was justified on the
ground that it was necessary to vindicate a state policy. However, the relevant cir-
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essential, especially in light of possible misuse of the corporate form
to shield taxpayers from personal liability. In using this approach,
however, the court has significantly extended the minimum contacts
theory with respect to a state "long-arm" statute. As a possible result
of this decision, state courts may attempt to use such statutes to
obtain jurisdiction over both individuals and corporations domiciled
in other states whose connections with the forum state are almost
non-existent. Whether there are sufficient minimum contacts to obtain
jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary, however, depends in large measure
upon the interests of a state in reaching the particular transaction; and
thus the expanded use of a state "long-arm" statute in a case of
national concern would not necessarily mean that a similar expansion
in a state case lacking such national interest would be held constitutional. In any event, the court's reliance on this doubtful relationship
lends much uncertainty to an area of the law which should be
characterized by certainty. Alternatively, the court might have followed the approach adopted in Young v. Masci,5 where the Supreme
Court in interpreting a nonresident motorist statute refused to apply
the doctrine of agency, in holding a nondomiciliary amenable to local
jurisdiction. Instead, the Court determined that it would be reasonable under the facts and in the interest of justice to subject the nondomiciliary to in personam jurisdiction. Since application of such a
test to the facts of Montreal Trust would probably not have produced
a different result, the majority should not have relied upon "a principalagent relationship so tenuous as to be non-existent...."2
cumstances through which jurisdiction was obtained were clearly those which the
taxpayer had with the United States as a whole. Since there were no applicable federal
standards, the court was forced to utilize the incorporative provisions of the "long-arm"
statute. Von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis,
79 HAIInv. L. ltuv. 1121, 1123 n.6 (1966).
25. 289 U.S. 253 (1933).
26. 358 F.2d at 258. For the facts upon which this agency relationship was found
see note 2, supra.
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Labor Law-Injunctions-State Court Injunctive
Proceeding for Breach of No-Strike Clause
Removable to Federal Court
Plaintiff, Avco Corporation, brought an action in state court for
injunctive and general relief against the defendant union, alleging
breach of the no-strike and mandatory arbitration clauses of their
collective bargaining agreement. After the injunction was issued,
defendant successfully removed' the case to the federal district court.
On plaintiff's motion to remand to state court, held, motion denied.
State court actions requesting injunctions for breach of collective
bargaining agreements may be removed to federal district courts since
these courts have original jurisdiction of such disputes which is not
obviated by the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Avco Corp. v. Lodge 735,
Machinists Union, 2 LAB. BEL.REP. (63 L.R.R.M.) 2014 (M.D. Tenn.
March 2, 1966).2
Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act empowered federal district
courts to entertain suits for violations of labor contracts between
unions and those industries affecting commerce. 3 Where a state court
injunctive action has been removed to a federal court, two principal
problems arise in determining whether the court has the power under
section 301 to entertain the suit. First, since diversity of citizenship
is not usually present, a federal question must be established to satisfy
the original jurisdiction requirements of the Removal Act. Second, the
court must find that this jurisdiction is not negated by section 4 of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which provides that no federal court
"shall have jurisdiction" to issue an injunction where employees cease
1. The pertinent provisions of the Removal Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964), under
which the removal was effected, are as follows: •
"(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original
jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court
of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such
action is pending.
"(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded
on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States
shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. Any
other such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly
joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is
brought."
2. This case is presently on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Interview with attorney for plaintiff-appellant.
3. Labor Management Relations Act § 301(a), 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §
185(a) (1964): "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties."
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to work or remain in an employment relation. 4 Any discussion of the

federal question requirement must begin with Textile Workers v.
Lincoln Mills,5 where the Supreme Court held that section 301 authorizes the fashioning of a body of federal substantive law for the
enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. The contention that
this federal substantive law doctrine deprives state courts of jurisdiction to enforce rights arising under collective bargaining agreements
was refuted in Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney.6 However, in
exercising this jurisdiction, the Supreme Court ruled in Local 174,
Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co.,7 that inconsistent doctrines of
local law must yield to the principles of federal law developed under
Lincoln Mills. The second problem in removing a state court injunctive proceeding is presented by Sinclair Refining Co. P. Atkinson, 8
where the Court held that section 301 actions were within the
injunction restrictions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and thus the
federal courts could not issue no-strike injunctions in section 301
breach of contract actions. The circuits have split on whether
Sinclair and its predecessors permit removal of a state court injunctive

proceeding to federal court.9 The Third Circuit has held that since
a state court action for an injunction for breach of a labor contract

was a "state-created" right not arising under any federal law, it was

not removable.10 The court also ruled that under the Norris-LaGuardia

Act the federal court lacked the "original jurisdiction" 1 of the subject
4. The Norris-LaGuardia Act § 1, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1964): "No
court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to
prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such dispute (as those
terms are herein defined) from doing whether singly or in concert, any of the
following acts: (a) ceasing or refusing to perform any work or remain in any relation
of employment."
5. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957).
6. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962). There the Court
expressly refused to rule on the following two questions which are involved in the
instant case: "Whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act might be applicable to a suit
brought in a state court for violation of a contract made by labor organization, and
whether there might be impediments to the free removal to a federal court of such
a suit." Id. at 514 n.8.
7. Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102 (1962).
8. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
9. In cases involving a paramount state interest, such as prevention of violence,
federal courts have been more inclined to show deference to state court actions. See
UAW-CIO v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958) (union violence subject to tort action in state
court); Acme Markets, Inc. v. Local 692, Retail Store Employees, 231 F. Supp. 566
(D.C. Md. 1964) (state court injunctive action to halt violence not removable).
10. American Dredging Co. v. Local 25, Operating Eng'rs, 338 F.2d 837 (3d Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 935 (1965).
11. In citing and discussing several meanings of "jurisdiction," the court concluded that the term as used in the Norris-LaGuardia Act means the authority to
take cognizance of injunctive actions. Id. at 840-42. Other courts have viewed
Norris-LaGuardia's withdrawal of jurisdiction as no more than a denial of the court's
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matter required by the Removal Act, and thus could not take cog-

nizance of the cause of action even if a federal question were shown.
The Ninth Circuit has ruled to the contrary,'- reasoning that under
the Lucas Flour and Dowd Box decisions, any action for breach of a
labor contract was necessarily a federal question within section 301
of the NLBA. 13 Evidently the Ninth Circuit did not feel that section 4
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act presented a problem, as it did not deal
14
with it.

Faced with plaintiff's contention that the lack of a federal question
rendered the Removal Act inapplicable, the court in the instant case
first reasoned that since Lucas Flour required inconsistent doctrines of
local law to yield to federal substantive law, state law no longer
existed "as an independent source of private rights in regard to
collective bargaining contracts." 15 Since under this analysis only

federal substantive law was applicable, a federal question was presented and the original jurisdiction requirement of the removal act
was thus satisfied. Turning next to plaintiff's argument that the
Norris-LaGuardia Act prevented federal courts from taking cog-

nizance of the subject matter when injunctive relief was sought, the
court cited Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co.,16 as authority for the
proposition that a district court has jurisdiction where both general
and injunctive relief is sought. 17 It was pointed out that in spite of a
power to give the requested relief; that is, the act does not prohibit the court from
taking the case under consideration. See note 20 infra. According to Professor Wright,
the federal courts have jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction. Each "has the power to
determine if it has the capacity to hear and decide the merits of the case before it."
WmiucH, FEDmAL CounTs 46 (1963). "[Jurisdiction] is the authority by which courts
and judicial officers take cognizance of and decide cases." Br.Acx, LAw DicTroNAIY
991 (4th ed. 1951).
12. Johnson v. England, 356 F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 1966). This was an original action
by the union in state court seeking both specific performance of an arbitration agreement and an injunction to restrain the trustee in bankruptcy of the former employer.
The decision is authority for the proposition that the cause of action arises under the
"laws of the United States," and is thus within the Removal Act.
13. Id. at 48. Accord, Minkoff v. Scranton Frocks, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y.
1959).
14. See Merchants Refrigerating Co. v. Local 6, Warehouse Union, 213 F. Supp. 177
(N.D. Cal. 1963) (Norris-LaGuardia Act and Sinclairheld to have deprived the district
court of jurisdiction even though federal question involved).
15. 2 LAB.REL. REP. at 2015.
16. Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962) (not to be confused with
its companion case Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962)).
17. See Oman Constr. Co. v. Local 327, Teamsters Union, 2 LAB. Rm.. laP. (63
L.R.R.M.) 2033 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 24, 1966) (action for injunction in state court
held removable). When plaintiff asks for general relief or damages in addition to an
injunction, there is less dispute over removal because the injunctive prohibitions of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the Sinclair case are not in issue as to the general
relief portion of the complaint. Removal may then be effected under the separate
controversy clause of the removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a), which permits defendant
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prayer for an injunction and damages in Atkinson, the Supreme Court
had remanded the case to the district court, and had thus indicated
its implicit approval of a federal district court's assumption of jurisdiction over a cause of action involving a prayer for injunctive relief.
The court added that even if the plaintiff had not asked for general
relief, the decision would remain the same since "a prayer for an
injunction constructively acts as a prayer for all appropriate relief."18

As a result of decisions such as the instant one, state courts must
comply with federal standards in labor injunctive proceedings or face

removal of these actions to federal courts. Although this indirect
application of Norris-LaGuardia is certainly not implicit in the words
of that act,19 this result appears inevitable when the provisions of the
Removal Act are considered. The original jurisdiction of a federal
court which is required by the Removal Act would not seem to be

obviated when a realistic interpretation of section 4 of the NorrisLaGuardia Act is adopted.2 0 It is highly unlikely that Congress

intended section 4 to deprive courts of the authority to entertain or
take cognizance of an action for injunctive relief, when in section 7

of the same act the courts are authorized to issue injunctions under
specified conditions.21 In addition the application of the federal sub-

stantive law doctrine of Lincoln Mills-Lucas Flour would seem to
support the instant decision. In his opinion for the majority in

Lincoln Mills, Mr. Justice Douglas said: "There is no constitutional
difficulty. Article III, § 2, extends the judicial power to cases 'arising
under ... the laws of the United States. . . .' A case or controversy
to remove to a federal court and there to have decided either all issues or just
the federal question, within the court's discretion. Professor Moore feels that "the
presence of a prayer for damages should not alter the result." IA Moo_ FEDERAL
PnRcATcE ff 0.167[7], at 1003 (2d ed. 1961).
18. 2 LAB. REL. REP. at 2016. FED. R. Cry. P. 54(c).
19. The statute refers only to the jurisdiction of federal courts. Lesnick, State-Court
Injunctions and the Federal Common Law of Labor Contracts: Beyond NorrisLaGuardia,79 HAnv. L. BEv. 757 (1966).
20. Publishers' Ass'n v. Printing Pressmen's Union, 246 F. Supp. 293, 295 (S.D.N.Y.
1965), found that the jurisdiction in Norris-LaGuardia "refers only to the authority
to grant an injunction after entertaining the suit." See Food Fair Stores, Inc. v.
District Council 11, Retail Clerks, 229 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1964), where the court
held that although Sinclair reaffirmed the restrictions of Norris-LaGuardia, "we do
not accept it as authority for the plaintiff's argument that this Court is without jurisdiction to even consider a complaint which prays for such [injunctive] relief ....
The
jurisdiction of this Court does not depend upon the ingenuity of the form of a complaint
in equity." Id. at 127. See Pocahontas Terminal Corp. v. Portland Bldg. & Constr. Trade
Council, 93 F. Supp. 217 (S.D. Me. 1950): "It [Norris-LaGuardia] does not deprive
the court of jurisdiction to consider cases in which such relief is asked, or to grant
other than injunctive relief therein." Id. at 224-25. See generally, CHIFEE, Somm PRoBLEMS oF EQUTrrY 367-74 (1950); Aaron, Strikes in Breach of Collective Agreements:
Some Unanswered Questions, 63 CoLUm. L. REv. 1027, 1040-52 (1963).
21. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1964).
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arising under § 301(a) is, therefore, one within the purview of
judicial power as defined in Article III."22 Thus the federal substantive

law developed by the federal courts may properly be equated with
"the laws of the United States" for purposes of satisfying the Removal
that removal does not necessarily produce
Act. It should also be noted
"an exercise in futility,"23 since the district courts have the power to
grant specific performance of an obligation to arbitrate,2 4 decree
damages,25 and order injunctive relief if the required conditions are
met.26 Realistically, however, the unfortunate result of such decisions
is that, aside from the often inadequate remedy of damages, 7 there
now appears to be no effective sanction for a union's breach of a nostrike clause.2a The Sinclair decision eliminated the federal courts as a
recourse for injunctive relief, and decisions such as the instant case
have the same practical effect on state courts. Yet a no-strike clause,
when coupled with a binding arbitration provision, has been viewed
favorably by the Supreme Court as being in harmony with national
labor policy.29 Perhaps the solution to this conflict between current
decisions and relevant policy considerations should be a legislative
one,30 or the Supreme Court could provide the desired result by
reversing the instant decision or by overruling Sinclair.31 However,
until some relief is provided, a no-strike clause seems of quite limited
utility.
22. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, supra note 5, at 457.
23. The basis for the contention that removal is futile is that plaintiff has an
effective remedy in the state court, yet when the federal court denies remand and
accepts the case, it is with the knowledge that no injunctive relief can be granted
due to Norris-LaGuardia.
24. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, supra note 5, at 451.
25. Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., supranote 7.
26. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1964) (injunctions by federal courts).
27. Damages as a remedy is inadequate primarily because it may come only after
the business has been forced to terminate due to the effects of the strike.
28. Both the Supreme Court and Congress have recognized that the effort for
industrial peace is purposeless unless both parties to a labor contract can have reasonable
assurance that the contract will be honored. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, supra
note 6, at 509. In Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, supra note 5, at 454, the Court
quoted from the legislative history of § 301 to the effect that one of its prime concerns
was to provide the employer with an effective remedy when the union failed to abide
by its contract.
29. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, supra note 5, at 455.
30. This could come in three forms: (1) a legislative declaration accommodating
Norris-LaGuardia and § 301 so as to overrule Sinclair; (2) the repeal of § 4 of NorrisLaGuardia; or (3) a specific prohibition against removal of this type of action to
federal court.
31. Sinclair was a 5-3 decision. A suggested method of avoiding the frustrating
consequences of removal is for the employer to seek specific performance of an arbitrator's award that the union cease to strike in violation of its contract. Although
Lincoln Mills indicates that arbitrator's awards are specifically enforcible, an award
of this nature might still run afoul of § 4 of Norris-LaGuardia.
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Municipal Corporations-Michigan Approves Use
of Municipal Industrial Development Bonds
Plaintiff, a municipal corporation, sought to issue tax exempt municipal revenue bonds to finance the acquisition of an industrial plant.'
The city council approved the bond issue and a plywood corporation
agreed to purchase land and construct the plant. Pursuant to the
agreement, the plywood corporation was to sell the completed facilities to the city with a lease-back provision lasting twenty-five years.2
After the plant had been constructed, defendant, the city clerk, refused to complete the transaction and plaintiff brought a mandamus
proceeding to compel performance. Upon certification to the Michigan
Supreme Court,3 held, a writ of mandamus would issue. The state
industrial development revenue bond act4 does not contravene Michigan's constitutional prohibitions against lending public credit for
private purposes. 5 Since the city's primary objective was to promote
the general public welfare, its issuance of revenue bonds pursuant to
this statute exhibited a public purpose in accordance with the provisions of the state constitution. City of Gaylord v. Beckett, 144
N.W.2d 460 (Mich. 1966).
6
The modem concept of municipal industrial development bonds
1. Revenue bonds are payable, both as to principal and interest, solely from revenues
derived from the operation of the project so financed. Britt v. City of Wilmington,
236 N.C. 446, 73 S.E.2d 289 (1952). Some statutes provide that the bonds can
be secured by a mortgage on the facilities while others authorize only a pledge of
income obtained from the facility. Abbey, Municipal Industrial Development Bonds, 19
VAND. L. REV. 25, 28 (1965). General obligation bonds, on the other band, are
payable from general ad valorem taxes on all taxable property and represent debts for
which the municipality is directly liable. DeLoach v. Scheper, 188 S.C. 21, 198 S.E.
409 (1938). See also Rivers v. City of Owensboro, 287 S.W.2d 151 (Ky. 1956).
Bonds must be authorized by enabling legislation since municipalities are creatures
of state legislation. Virtue, The Public Use of Private Capital: A Discussion of Problems Related to Municipal Bond Financing, 35 VA. L. B.Ev. 285, 304 n.66 (1949).
2. The rentals payable by the plywood company were to be sufficient to make the
bonds self-liquidating. After the twenty-five-year lease period, the company was to
have an option to buy the premises for one dollar. City of Gaylord v. Beckett, 144
N.W.2d 460, 464 (Mich. 1966).
3. A total of eight questions were certified to the Michigan Supreme Court dealing with the interpretation of and the validity of the enabling act in light of various provisions of the state constitution, as amended. The crucial questions in this case
involved those constitutional provisions relating to the lending of the public credit
and the application of the public purpose doctrine.
4. Micir. STAT. ANN. § 5.3533(21) (Supp. 1, 1965). For a compilation of similar
provisions enacted in other jurisdictions, see Abbey, supra note 1, at 67-71.
5. The state constitution broadly declared that the public health and general welfare
were matters of public concern. MIcH. CoNsT. art. IV, § 51.
6. The Mississippi plan was not the first plan involving the encouragement of new
industrial development through the use of public funds. The colony of Virginia had
a tobacco bounty plan to encourage the textile industry and several states issued railroad bonds in the era of nineteenth-century railroad expansion. Pinsky, State Constitutional Limitations on Public Industrial Financing: An Historical and Economic
Approach, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 265-66 n.4 (1963).
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originated with the Mississippi Balance Agriculture With Industry
Law (BAWI),7 enacted in 1936 to relieve severe economic conditions

caused, in part, by the depression8 and to accelerate the advent of the
industrial "take-off" period. 9 The BAWI plan authorized issuance of
general obligation bonds by any municipality to finance industrial
plant construction, subject to approval by the municipal electorate

and the Mississippi Agricultural and Industrial Board. The facilities
so constructed were to be leased to the incoming industry.' 0 This plan
was attacked on the grounds that (1) the state constitution required
the taxing and borrowing power to be used only for a public purpose,

and (2) the credit of the state, or its political subdivisions, could not
be used for the aid of private parties. These challenges were success-

fully met in Albritton v. City of Winona," where the state supreme
court held that the public purpose requirement was satisfied. 12 Subsequently, other southern states adopted industrial development bond
laws for economic reasons similar to those of Mississippi. Revenue

bonds rather than general obligation bonds were utilized in most
plans 13 and constitutional attacks in state courts, based primarily upon
the public purpose doctrine, were usually unsuccessful.' 4 Criteria
used by the courts to determine the existence of a public purpose
were often vague and undefined, but the general approach to the
problem seemed to be whether there was a net gain to the community as a whole. 15 Other courts, viewing the problem in terms of
the credit clause, found that the issuance of self-liquidating revenue
7. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 8936-24 (1956) (re-enacted). For an extensive discussion of the BAWl program, see Bell, Legal Problems That May Be Encountered in
the Administration of Mississippi's BAW1 Program, 29 Miss. L.J. 22 (1957).
8. Pinsky, supra note 6, at 267.
9. See W. W. RosTow, THE STAGES OF EcoNoiNc GROWTH 6-9 (1960), where
"take-off" is described as the period where growth becomes a normal condition, compound interest becomes a part of society's habits, and industrial expansion is rapid.
10. Abbey, supra note 1, at 27.
11. 181 Miss. 75, 178 So. 799, appeal dismissedper curiam, 303 U.S. 627 (1938).
12. In so holding, the majority of the Mississippi Supreme Court viewed the public
purpose as the promotion of the welfare, peace, happiness, and prosperity of the state's
citizens. The court declined to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature as to
the means of accomplishing that purpose. Id. at 95, 178 So. at 803.
13. Revenue bonds were favored because with them the municipality incurred
only limited liability. See note 1 supra; Pinsky, supra note 6, at 268.
14. See, e.g., Wayland v. Snapp, 334 S.W.2d 633 (Ark. 1960). Contra, State v.
Town of North Miami, 59 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 1952). Suits attacking the constitutionality
of the bond enabling acts were often brought by industrialists and other interested
parties to secure judicial approval of such projects. Note, 70 YALE L.J. 789, 791 (1961).
15. Dyche v. City of London, 288 S.W.2d 648 (Ky. 1956) (underlying economic
conditions determine public nature); Village of Deming v. Hosdreg Co., 62 N.M. 18,
303 P.2d 920 (1956) (overall picture must indicate a comfortable balance of advantages over disadvantages). See 66 HARv. L. REv. 898 (1953). Cf. Polanski v.
Town of Eagle Point, 30 Wis. 2d 507, 141 N.W.2d 281 (1966) (Public purpose is a
matter of law, not fact).
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bonds did not constitute a lending of credit since no charges were
made on tax revenues and no ad valorem taxes or property assessments
were imposed on the citizens of the community. 16 As the industrial
revenue bond and similar 17 plans became widespread during the
1950's,18 certain interest groups expressed varying degrees of opposition to them. 19 The most vocal was the Investment Bankers Associ-

ation which, in 1951, adopted a resolution expressly condemning the
use of municipal revenue bonds to finance industrial development. 0
The IBA, reflecting the views of revenue bond opponents generally,
asserted that "principle and good government" are violated by industrial bond financing since: (1) increasing amounts of industrial
facilities become owned by the government, causing erosion of local
tax bases; (2) the tax-exempt status of municipal bonds is abused;
(3) economic dislocations are likely in areas unable to sustain such
industry; and (4) industrial piracy becomes widespread.2 ' The use
of these tax-exempt2 bonds to reduce the federal income taxes paid
by participating corporations has been of special concern to the
Treasury.23 In an effort to curb this practice, bills have been introduced in Congress which would remove the tax exemption from mu16. Sublett v. City of Tulsa, 405 P.2d 185 (Okla. 1965). See generally City of
Dearborn v. Michigan Turnpike Auth., 344 Mich. 37, 73 N.W.2d 544 (1955). There
are ways, however, in which the municipality may be liable to revenue bond holders.
Some theories include: (1) gross negligence in issuance, (2) misrepresentation, (3)
breach of implied covenant, warranty, or good faith, and (4) breach of trust. Note,
70 YALE L.J. 789, 793 (1961).
17. Several other plans have been implemented in areas outside the South. These
include the Pennsylvania plan (second mortgage loans financed by current taxation),
the New England plan (state insurance of first mortgages), and the Oklahoma plan
(general obligation bonds to finance mortgage loans to local nonprofit development
corporations). Pinsky, supra note 6, at 269-72.
18. For an indication of the increased use of industrial revenue bonds in recent
years, see Business Week, Dec. 14, 1963, p. 45.
19. These groups include the Investment Bankers Association, the AFL-CIO, the
American Bar Association, and the Association of Municipal Finance Officers. Ibid.
20. Reilly, Industrial Aid Financing: Pro and Con Arguments, The Commercial and
Financial Chronicle, April 29, 1965, p. 16.
21. Public Management, Jan. 1965, pp. 16-17. See also Westmeyer, Industrial Bond
Controversy Boils, National Civic Review, June 1964, pp. 329-30.
22. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 103.

23. A typical scheme would include a purchase of the entire bond issue by the
incoming corporation. Rents paid to the municipality under the lease would be returned, in part, to the corporation in the form of tax-free interest on the bonds. A
double benefit is possible since such rental payments may be deductible as business
expenses under § 162 of the Internal Revenue Code. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 162(a)(3) (rental deduction not allowed if taxpayer takes title to or acquires
equity in the premises). Cf. Gem, Inc. v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 841 (N.D.
Miss. 1961) (deduction allowed although there was a provision for successive lease
renewals at nominal rentals). This practice prompted Treasury Secretary Fowler to
label industrial revenue bonds as a "new financial arrangement" to which the Treasury
"cant condone extension of the tax exemption." The Wall Street Journal, June 17,
1966, p. 22, col. 3.
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nicipal revenue bonds used for industrial development. 24 Another
criticism of these bonds is that small communities may undertake large
development projects with little chance of success. Since the municipality could become directly liable to the revenue bond holders
under the theories of misrepresentation or breach of implied covenant
of good faith, the tax revenues of the municipality could be reached
to satisfy such creditors. Thus, two states, Mississippi 2 and Tennessee,2 require prior approval of state agencies before industrial
projects are publicly financed.
In the instant case the court faced the initial task of determining
the constitutionality of the Michigan revenue bond enabling act in
light of the state constitution's public credit and public purpose
clauses.2 Although the court recognized that liability might possibly
29
be imposed upon the municipality under one of several theories, it
found that the revenue bond enabling act was not an attempt to
authorize loans of public credit. In so holding, the court noted that
potential governmental liability was a danger common to all municipal and state revenue bonds whatever their nature, and looked to
a previous decision ° holding that an issuance of revenue bonds for
highway development was not a pledge of the state's credit. Turning
to the challenged existence of a public purpose in the instant plan,
the majority applied what seemed to be a "net worth" test,31 and
found that since the plan promoted the general economic welfare of
the community, it satisfied the constitutional requirement. The court
found additional support for its conclusion in the weight of authority
upholding municipal industrial development financing which had been
similarly challenged. 32
Before enacting revenue bond enabling acts or advocating the approval of proposed revenue bond financing plans, legislators and administrators should examine the state's constitutional and statutory
24. E.g., H.R. 517, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
25. See note 16 supra.
26. Miss. CoDE ANN. § 8936-52 (Supp. 1964).
27. TENr. CoPE ANt. § 2902-03 (Supp. 1966) (requirement for general obligation

bonds only).
28. Other questions certified to the court concerned technical and procedural
aspects of the enactment of the enabling act and compliance with the requirements
of the city charter. The certified questions were all resolved in favor of the city.
29. City of Gaylord v. Beckett, supra note 2, at 466-67.
30. Schureman v. State Highway Comm'n, 377 Mich. 609, 141 N.W.2d 62 (1966).
31. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
32. City of Gaylord v. Beckett, supra note 2, at 467. Since the enabling act in
question in the principal case was enacted eight months prior to the effective date of
the newly-amended constitution, the dissent, after a lengthy discussion and comparison
of the two constitutions, found that the act should be interpreted according to the
old constitution. This conclusion was based largely on constitutional procedural
grounds. The majority construed the act in light of the newly-amended constitution.
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framework with a view toward affording the best protection for both
public and private interests. In this light, at least three important
policy questions can be raised in addition to the typical public credit
and public purpose issues. First, how broad is the state's power of
eminent domain when used in the furtherance of such plans; that is,
what factors should be- considered in determining the extent of community power to condemn private property and convert it to the use
of private manufacturing concerns? Generally, statutes dealing with
eminent domain have required a public "use" rather than the broader
requirement of a public "purpose,"3 but since the municipality acquires title to the land which is developed for industrial use, it can
be argued that the public is, in effect, using the land. 34 Thus, even
the public use statutes may not afford the desired degree of protection in this important area. Second, how can the community best be
protected from revenue bond liability incurred through negligent misrepresentation of its capacity to support manufacturing industries?
Administrative agencies similar to Mississippi's Agricultural and Industrial Board could be established to evaluate local conditions before
approving proposed revenue bond plans, thus substantially reducing
the risk of direct municipal liability. Third, how can the plans be
tailored to prevent abuse of the tax-exempt treatment of municipal
bonds under section 103 of the Internal Revenue Code? One method
would be to prohibit the incoming corporation from purchasing all or
substantially all of the bond issue.35
Revenue bond financing of industrial development has become an
established practice in an increasing number of localities, despite continued controversy among regional,36 corporate, financial, and labor
interests over the legality and propriety of revenue bond plans.37
Once industrial revenue bond plans are adequately safeguarded
through prudent legislation and administration, they would seem to
fulfill a public purpose by accelerating the industrial "take-off' periods,
stimulating sluggish economies, and providing additional jobs in
33. Abbey, supra note 1, at 63.
34. Although this problem has not yet arisen concerning industrial development
bonds, it could be contended that the municipality, as lessor, is indirectly using the
land by deriving rentals therefrom. It should be noted that statutes in four states
authorize the acquisition of specific industrial sites by condemnation. Id. at 63 & n.138.
Additionally, legislatures have the right to declare what constitutes a public use. E.g.,
State ex rel. Smith v. Kemp, 124 Kan. 716, 261 Pac. 556 (1927), writ of error dismissed,
278 U.S. 191 (1928).
35. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
36. Prior to the growing trend toward revenue bond financing of industrial development, use of these plans was largely confined to the Southern states that pioneered
them. Consequently these plans met with some disfavor among Northern and Eastern
interests which feared the "pirating" of their industry. See generally Westmeyer,
Industrial Bond Controversy Boils, National Civic Review, June 1964, pp. 329-30.
37. See generally Business Week, Dec. 14, 1963, p. 45.
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regions of unemployment. While such plans make some inroads on
traditional free enterprise concepts, it should be recognized that
governmental activity in this area is not a new development, and
it would be unrealistic to expect local governments to ignore possible
advantages available through properly administered bond plans.

State Taxation-Commerce Clause-Privilege Tax
Measured by Gross Receipts on Commissions
Received From Interstate Solicitation Held Valid
Defendant, a West Virginia corporation, was a manufacturers'
representative and merchandise broker which solicited orders for
certain manufacturers under a fanchise or contract agreement. Orders
were solicited from wholesalers and chain-store operators located in
West Virginia and sent by the defendant to the manufacturers, the
great majority of which were located outside West Virginia.' Upon
acceptance of the order by the manufacturer, the merchandise was
shipped directly to the West Virginia purchaser. All of the defendant's
income came from commissions received from these manufacturers.
Pursuant to statute, West Virginia levied and collected a tax measured
by defendant's gross receipts for the privilege of conducting business
activity within the state. 2 Plaintiff, State Tax Commissioner of West
Virginia, then instituted an action for declaratory judgment to determine whether the taxes were unlawfully collected. The defendant
contended that the tax constituted an unconstitutional burden on
interstate commerce, while the plaintiff maintained that the tax was
lawful since it was levied on the privilege of conducting a business
activity performed wholly within the state of West Virginia. The
trial court entered judgment for the defendant. On appeal to the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, held, reversed. Where a
manufacturers' representative obtains orders from resident wholesalers
and chain store operators for merchandise shipped by nonresident
sellers, imposition of a gross earnings tax on commissions paid to
the representative does not violate the commerce clause. State ex rel.
Battle v. B. D. Bailey & Sons, Inc., 146 S.E.2d 686 (W. Va. 1965).
1. Approximately 90% of the defendant's gross business was transacted with manufacturers or food processors located outside of West Virginia. State ex rel. Battle v.
B. D. Bailey & Sons, Inc., 146 S.E.2d 686, 689 (W. Va. 1965).
2. "[2h] Service Business or Calling Not Otherwise Specifically Taxed.-Upon every
person engaging or continuing within this state in any service business or calling . . .

there is . ..levied and shall be collected a tax equal to one and five one-hundredths
per cent of the gross income of any such business." W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 960(8)
(1961).
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The Supreme Court has traditionally protected interstate commerce
from state and local taxes levied directly on the gross income from
interstate transactions.3 State legislatures have been permitted, however, to levy a tax on certain local privileges and measure the tax by
gross receipts even though the tax constituted an "indirect" burden
on interstate commerce. 4 This "direct-indirect burdens" test drew
considerable criticism from Mr. Justice Stone, and beginning in 1938
with the case of Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue,5 the Court's
approach to the constitutionality of state gross income taxes was substantially altered by his influence. In that case Mr. Justice Stone laid
the groundwork for the "multiple burdens" theory under which the
Court was primarily concerned with whether the tax would place interstate commerce at a competitive disadvantage with local business. 6
This theory seemed to be founded upon the two main propositions that
interstate commerce should pay its just share of state tax burdens,
and that state taxes on interstate commerce should be sustained
when not involving the risk of cumulative burdens not imposed on
local commerce." Although the "multiple burdens" test was heavily
relied upon by the Supreme Court for a number of years,8 this test
was rejected and the "direct-indirect" test was resurrected by the
Court in the case of Freeman v. Hewit.9 Speaking for the majority,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter dismissed the "multiple burdens" doctrine as
"fashions" in judicial writing and struck down an Indiana tax on
gross income as a "direct" tax "on" interstate commerce. 10 Although
184 (1953).
4. Compare American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919) (tax levied upon
the privilege of manufacturing and measured by gross receipts upheld), with J. D.
Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938) (tax levied directly "on" gross receipts
from the sale of manufactured goods held invalid). Hartman, State Taxation of Income
from a Multistate Business, in SELECEr PROBLEMS IN THE LAw OF COI'oATE PRACTICE
20, 92 (Roady & Andersen ed. 1960).
5. 303 U.S. 250 (1938) (privilege tax levied upon gross amount received from
interstate advertising upheld). See Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44 (1927)
(Stone, J.,
dissenting).
6. See, e.g., Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939), where
the Court struck down a Washington occupation tax even though Washington had
used the correct statutory formula by placing the tax upon the privilege of growing
fruit within the state and measuring the value of the privilege by the grower's gross
receipts. The Court felt that a similar tax could be levied on the same sales proceeds
by those states in which the fruit was shipped and subsequently sold. Thus, the tax
would place interstate commerce at a competitive disadvantage with local commerce.
7. Hartman, supra note 4, at 95.
8. See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340
(1944), where Indiana was allowed to apply her gross income tax to receipts from
interstate transactions consummated within its borders on the ground that not
to allow the tax would be to make local industry suffer a competitive disadvantage.
9. 329 U.S. 249 (1946) (tax on proceeds from the sale of certain securities of an
Indiana trust estate on the New York Stock Exchange held invalid).
10. Id. at 253-54.
3. H~nmAN, STATE TAxATiON OF INTEnSTAT.E CoMMERcE 180,
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the subsequent cases did not produce a uniform test," the Supreme
Court once again stressed the importance of finding a "local activity"
or a "local incident" that would support the gross receipts tax,12 but
the extent of immunity to be afforded a particular transaction remained
in doubt until Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue13 was decided in
1951. In that case, Illinois sought to impose an occupation tax,
measured by gross receipts, upon a foreign corporation which maintained a sales office and warehouse in Chicago. Some orders were
forwarded by the Illinois branch office to the manufacturer, while other
orders were mailed by Illinois customers to Massachusetts. The
Court held that Illinois could include receipts from all sales that
utilized the branch office either in receiving the orders or in distributing the goods. Illinois was not permitted, however, to include proceeds
11. See, e.g., Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948), in which
a gross receipts tax levied upon proceeds from interstate transportation of passengers
was held invalid because the tax was unapportioned, but the Court stated that the
tax would be upheld if properly apportioned even though the tax was levied "on"
gross receipts from interstate transportation; Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co.,
330 U.S. 422 (1947), in which a gross receipts tax on stevedoring was held invalid
because the Court could not find a sufficient local event to sustain the tax and
because a multiple tax burden could possibly be placed on the proceeds.
12. Originally the Supreme Court required that substantial localism be found before
allowing the imposition of a gross receipts tax. See Pugent Sound Stevedoring Co. v.
Tax Comm'n, 302 U.S. 90 (1937) (loading and unloading interstate business held nontaxable activity); Fisher's Blend Station, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 297 U.S. 650
(1936) (occupation tax on broadcasting measured by gross receipts from advertising
struck down as a tax on interstate commerce); Cheney Bros. Co. v. Massachusetts, 246
U.S. 147 (1918) (in-state office which received orders but did not accept them could
not form the basis for a tax). Under the influence of Mr. Justice Stone the Court had
developed, primarily in a series of income tax cases, a more liberal interpretation of the
local incident necessary to support a state tax. See MeGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal
Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940), where the Court upheld a New York City sales tax
levied upon a Pennsylvania seller who maintained a sales office in New York City
at which it received and accepted orders for the sale of coal. The Court found that
the delivery of the goods within the taxing state was a sufficient local incident to sustain
the tax. Using Berwind-White as the basis of its decision, the Court in McGoldrick v.
Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co., 309 U.S. 70 (1940), upheld a sales tax measured by gross
income where the only local activity of the vendor was the solicitation of orders
through an agent, even though the Court had consistently held that the solicitation
of orders for the interstate sale of goods was not a taxable "local incident" of interstate commerce. With the passing of Mr. Justice Stone and the rejection of the "multiple
burdens" doctrine, however, the concept of a taxable "local activity" was considerably
restricted. Thus, although McGoldrick v. Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co., supra, seemed to
indicate that solicitation might lose its commerce clause immunity, the Supreme Court
in Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946), made it clear that such was
not the case. Striking down a municipal ordinance requiring solicitors to pay a
license tax, the Court stated that if the only thing necessary to sustain a state tax
bearing upon interstate commerce were to discover some local incident and then to
lay the tax on that incident, all interstate commerce could be subjected to state
taxation. In so holding, the Court extended the doctrine established in 1887 by
Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887), that the solicitation of
sales is an essential and integral non-taxable part of interstate commerce.
13. 340 U.S. 534 (1951).

RECENT CASES
from the orders sent directly by the customer to the manufacturer's
out-of-state home office where the order was filled and the goods
shipped directly to the customer. One authority has pointed out that
the Court clearly indicated in Norton what transactions Illinois could
regard as taxable local activities but it failed to state the reasons why
some of the transactions were taxable.14 In Field Enterprises,Inc. v.
Washington,15 the Supreme Court relied upon its decision in Norto to
affirm per curiam a decision of the Washington Supreme Court upholding a business and occupation tax upon a foreign corporation even
though its local activity was confined to maintaining an office which
was used to instruct salesmen and transmit orders out of state for
acceptance and direct shipment to the purchasers. Nearly eight years
later, in General Motors Corp. v. Washington,16 the State of Washington was permitted to tax gross receipts from sales of automobiles and
spare parts which were shipped to dealer-purchasers in the state
pursuant to orders sent by the dealers to General Motors' offices outside the state. In finding the sales taxable, the Court apparently
relied upon "the bundle of corporate activity" by the taxpayer within
the taxing state.' 7 The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Clark,
stated the test to be, "whether the State has exerted its power in
proper proportion to appellants activities within the State" and
"whether the state has given anything for which it can ask return."'8
The majority in the instant case recognized that the shipments of
merchandise from nonresident sellers to resident buyers constituted
shipments in interstate commerce, but found that the defendant taxpayer was engaged in the performance of services within the state,
as distinguished from the solicitation of the sale of goods for interstate transportation or shipment of property. The court concluded,
therefore, that the defendant taxpayer could not be exempt from
payment of the taxes merely because its business incidentally involved
14. Hartman, State Taxation of Corporate Income from a Multistate Business, 13
V.ND. L. REv. 21, 107-08 (1959). In view of the instant case, Professor Hartman
points out the very interesting observation: "[Ijt is not clear whether the Court is
saying that local activity of the branch office may bring within the taxing power of
the state some other transactions which otherwise would escape taxation on commerce
clause grounds. Specifically, would those controversial transactions [in the Norton case]
have been held to be taxable if the Illinois branch office bad done nothing but solicit the
orders from customers?" Id. at 108.
15. 47 Wash. 2d 852, 289 P.2d 1010 (1955), aff'd per curiam, 352 U.S. 806 (1956).
For an interesting discussion of this case in relation to the Supreme Court's treatment
of local incidents see Strecker, "Local Incidents" of Interstate Business, 18 Omo ST.
L.J. 69, 71-78 (1957).
16. 377 U.S. 436 (1964).
17. Id. at 447.
18. Id. at 441 (quoting from Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444
(1940)). "A careful analysis of the cases in this field teaches that the validity of the
tax rests upon whether the State is exacting a constitutionally fair demand for that
aspect of interstate commerce to which it bears a special relation." Id. at 440.
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interstate commerce. Finally, the tax was held to satisfy the "discrimination" or "multiple burdens" tests set forth by the Supreme
Court since the taxpayer could not be taxed by any other state and
since even if the tax affected interstate commerce in some way, its
application was too remote to constitute an unconstitutional burden
on interstate commerce. 19 Judge Haymond, in his dissenting opinion,
maintained that the taxpayer engaged directly in the sale of goods
in interstate commerce. 20 He felt, therefore, that the defendant's
commissions constituted earnings derived from interstate commerce,
and the tax imposed upon such income contravened the commerce
clause.
In holding that the taxpayer was not engaged in interstate commerce but merely rendered services as an intermediary between nonresident sellers and resident buyers, the court in the instant case drew
a superficial distinction that is difficult to justify on the facts. The
dissenting argument of Judge Haymond that "there would have been
no nonresident sellers, no resident buyers, and no interstate shipment
of goods ... without the business activities of the defendant .
"...,21
correctly pointed out that the defendant's business activities had more
than an incidental relationship to interstate commerce. However, the
result reached by the majority was probably correct since there was
no burden on interstate commerce not borne by intrastate commerce,
and since the interstate commerce involved was not subject to the
risk of repeated exactions of the same nature from other states. Yet,
the problem remains of reconciling this case with Supreme Court
decisions which have consistently held that mere solicitation for interstate sales is a non-taxable local activity which does not meet the
"local incident" rule. Since all of defendant's business activities took
place within West Virginia, the instant case can be distinguished
from the usual "drummer" situation where solicitors travel across state
lines. Furthermore, it is obvious that the defendant's activities constitute more local activity than has been the case when the Supreme
19. Judge Berry concurred in the majority opinion but upon the ground that any
previous cases decided by the West Virginia Court which might indicate that income
from personal services performed within the state could not be taxed because such
services were a burden on or discriminated against interstate commerce, should be
specifically overruled. Judge Berry stated that a state should not be prohibited from
taxing its citizens or resident corporations for the privilege of doing business within the
state because the income therefrom is derived from orders taken by them from others
doing business within the state. 146 S.E.2d at 695.
20. "It is clear beyond question that there would have been no nonresident sellers,
no resident buyers, and no interstate shipment of goods, with respect to the subject
matter of this case, without the business activities of the defendant and that the sales
and consequent interstate shipments of goods were produced by and resulted from the
business activities and transactions conducted and engaged in by the defendant." Id.
at 700.
21. 146 S.E.2d at 695.
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Court has spoken of interstate solicitation as an insufficient "local
incident" to support a gross receipts tax. Finally, the Supreme Court's
recent holding that the validity of a gross receipts tax should depend
upon the "bundle of corporate activity" and "whether the state has
given anything for which it can ask return," lends considerable support
to the result reached by the West Virginia court. In fact, not to
subject the defendant corporation to the tax would definitely be a
discrimination against intrastate commerce, and Mr. Justice Stone's
contention that interstate commerce should pay its own way seems
particularly relevant. Although the instant case would probably have
been more significant if it had not relied upon superficial distinctions,
it is nevertheless of considerable importance in demonstrating the need
for a more flexible rule to govern state taxation of interstate solicitation.
The pronouncements of the Supreme Court do not provide a satisfactory basis for deciding cases in which there is a significant local
activity which is technically interstate solicitation. The instant case
correctly indicates that extensive local activity in the furtherance of
interstate solicitation should be sufficient to bring within the taxing
power of a state the interstate solicitation which would otherwise
escape taxation on commerce clause grounds.
Taxation-Federal Income Taxation-Capital Gains
Treatment of Sale of Professional Goodwill
Taxpayer, a certified public accountant, made an oral partnership
agreement in 1957 for the sale' of a one-half interest in his accounting
practice.2 On his federal income tax returns for the years 1959 through
1961, he reported the installments received on the purchase price as
long term capital gains3 from the sale of professional goodwill. The
1. There is no professional prohibition against the sale of an accounting practice
by a Certified Public Accountant. CAREY, PRoF-ssioNAL ETCs OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC

AccoumNTs 206 (1956).
2. Prior to 1956, Butler operated his accounting business as a sole proprietorship,

employing four persons, including the purchaser of the partnership interest. The
value of the business was approximately $40,000, or one year's gross fees.

The

one-half interest was computed to be $20,000 (or one-half of the total worth) for
which interest the purchaser would pay $10,000 in scheduled installments. Butler
was to receive 607o of the profits in 1957, and in decreasing stages of percentages
until 1961 when each partner's share would be equal. The agreement called for the
seller to render continued service to the business.
3. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 1221-22. From the $10,000 sale price Butler received
$2500 in 1959 and 1960, and $1500 in 1961. On his income tax returns for these
years he reported as capital gains the amounts of $2,410.50, $2,410.50, and $1,446.30,
respectively. These amounts were determined by reducing the total payments he
received in each of these years by amounts obtained by multiplying such payment by
a fraction whose numerator was one-half of the book value of the tangible assets and
whose denominator was $10,000. One-half of the amount of capital gain was reported
as taxable income for that year.
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Commissioner assessed a deficiency, 4 treating the gains as ordinary
income on the ground that payment for the partnership interest in
excess of the tangible assets was received either for relinquishment of
the right to receive ordinary income in the future, or as present
payment for future services, or for a combination of the two.5 On
petition to the Tax Court of the United States, held, the Commissioner's action was incorrect. Proceeds from a sale of goodwill,
resulting from the transfer of an interest in a professional practice,
are entitled to capital gains treatment even though the transferor
continues in the practice. Butler v. Commissioner,46 T.C. 280 (1966).
Although its intangible nature precludes a concise definition, 6 professional goodwill may be considered as "the probability that the
customers of the old establishment will continue their patronage."7
For thirty years there has been a controversy between the courts and
the Internal Revenue Service over whether gains from the sale of
goodwill should be reported as capital gains or as ordinary income.
In 1935, the Board of Tax Appeals decided O'Rear v. Commissioner,"
holding that amounts paid to a lawyer for admission of partners represented his right to part of the future earnings of the practice and
were, therefore, taxable as ordinary income. On this basis, the Commissioner first refused to acknowledge the existence of professional
goodwill as a transferable asset, maintaining that goodwill could not
be disposed of if it depended exclusively upon the professional skill
or personal characteristics of the seller. 9 When subsequent decisions
rendered this position untenable, 10 the Commissioner ruled that professional goodwill could not be transferred unless exclusive use to
the name of the business was purchased as well." The courts, however, specifically rejected this interpretation in three cases involving
4. For calendar years 1959, 1960, 1961, in the amounts of $361.58, $361.57, and
$216.95, respectively.,
5. If the payment is considered to be for present or future services, it cannot result
in capital gain. If it is considered as assignment of future ordinary income, it results
in present ordinary income. See Freling, Sales of Intangible Business Assets, 14
TuL. TAx INST. 209, 240 (1965); 19 J. TAxATnoN 335 (1963).
6. McDonald, Goodwill and the Federal Income Tax, 45 VA. L. Rev. 645 (1959);
Note, An Inquiry Into the Nature of Goodwill, 53 CoLxmr. L. R v. 660 (1953).
7. Richard S. Wyler, 14 T.C. 1251, 1259 (1950).
8. 80 F.2d 473 (6th Cir. 1935), affirming 28 B.T.A. 698 (1933).
9. Rev. Rul. 60-301, 1960-2 Cum. BuLL. 15.
10. Since 1935 the courts have failed to follow O'Rear and have distinguished it on
several bases: age, that the statements made there concerning goodwill were dicta, and
that a more recdnt group of cases was controlling. See, e.g., Estate of Leo Melnik, 21
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 671 (1962), aff'd sub nom. Karan v. Commissioner, 319 F.2d
303 (7th Cir. 1963) (sale of accounting practice); Rees v. United States, 187 F.
Supp. 924 (D. Ore. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 295 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1961); Malcolm
J. Watson, 35 T.C. 203 (1960). See also 3B MERITENS, FEDRAL. INCOME TAXATION
§ 22.50 (Malone rev. ed. 1966).
11. Rev. Rul. 57-480, 1957-2 Cum. BUl . 47.
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the sale of an accounting practice.'2 The Commissioner, therefore,
reluctantly acquiesced and modified his position to recognize goodwill as a salable capital asset 13 regardless of dependence upon professional skill or the use of the business name. 14 He has steadfastly
refused, however, to permit capital gains treatment of proceeds from
the sale of professional goodwill if the practitioner continues in the
business,' 5 even though the only two cases directly in point have

rejected this contention also. In Rees v. United States,16 a federal
district court held that the goodwill involved in the sale of a partnership interest in a dental practice might be treated as a capital asset

even though the taxpayer remained active in the same practice.
Similarly, in Malcolm 1. Watson,17 where an accountant was to remain

in the business for ten years after selling partnership interests, the
Tax Court held that gains realized on the sale of professional good-

will are capital gains, regardless of whether the transferor continues
in active practice with the purchasers. The Commissioner,

a

however,

contends that to have an actual or effective transfer of goodwill, the
seller must separate himself from the clients. 9 If he does not remove

himself entirely from the business, the Commissioner argues, he continues to share in the goodwill to the same extent as he did before the

alleged transfer.
In the instant case, the court found that before the sale of the
partnership interest, the taxpayer had the full benefit derived from
both the goodwill and the tangible capital assets. It reasoned that
subsequent to the transfer, the taxpayer obtained the benefits from
12. Estate of Masquelette v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1956), reversing
14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 879 (1955); Richard S. Wyler, 14 T.C. 1251 (1950); Rodney
B. Horton, 13 T.C. 143 (1949).
13. Rev. Rul. 55-79, 1955-1 Cum. BuLL. 370.
14. See Rev. Rul. 60-301, 1960-2 Cum. BuLL. 15, for the Commissioner's acquiesence
in Estate of Masquelette v. Commissioner, supra note 12, and 1959-2 Cum. BULL. 7,
for the Commissioner's acquiesence in Richard S. Wyler, supra note 12 and Rodney B.
Horton, supra note 12.
15. Rev. Rul. 64-235, 1964-2 Cu . BuLL. 18, modifying Rev. Rul. 57-480, 1957-2
Cum. BULL. 47, Rev. Rd. 60-301, 1960-2 Cu . BuLL. 15, and superseding Rev. Rul.
62-114, 1962-2 Gum. BULL. 15.
16. Supra note 10.
17. Supra note 10.
18. See Rev. Rul. 64-235, 1964-2 Cum. BULL. 18; Rev. Rul. 62-114, 1962-2 Ctm.
BULL. 15, based on T.I.R. 388 (June 29, 1962), reflecting Rev. Rul. 57-480, 1957-2
Cum. BurL. 47.
19. Rev. Rul. 64-235, 1964-2 Cum. BULL. 18, stated, in essence, that CI) professional
goodwill is a salable capital asset, (2) a one-man professional practice or any other
one-man business can have salable good will, (3) the extent to which the proceeds
of a sale can be allocated to good will shall be 'determined on the facts rather than
by whether the business is, or is not, dependent solely upon the professional sidil or other
personal characteristics, (4) where a man takes in partners rather than transfering his
entire practice, he cannot be regarded as having made a sale of goodwill within the
meaning of the code provision relating to capital gain or loss.
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the tangible assets and the goodwill only to the extent of his proportionate interest in the business. Finding that a partial transfer had
been made, the Commissioner's contention that a sale of goodwill
could only be accomplished by total disposition was rejected. The
results reached in Rees and Watson were approved and that portion
of the O'Rear decision urged by the Commissioner to be controlling
was dismissed as dicta. Thus the court concluded that there may be
a partial transfer of professional goodwill by a transferor who remains
in the practice.
The Butler decision has eliminated the last line of resistance to
capital gains treatment of proceeds from the sale of professional good
will by rejecting the arguments that professional goodwill is not a
vendable capital asset, and that a partial disposition of professional
goodwill is not possible. If professional goodwill reflects the desire
of business clients to continue to patronize the practitioner's services,
then its sale is an attempt to shift future client patronage. One
writer,20 reasoning that such a transfer can be accomplished only by
the seller's removal from the business and abstention from competing
for the former client's patronage, has suggested that an effective
disposition of goodwill is the practical equivalent of a covenant not
to compete. If amounts derived from a sale of a covenant not to
compete result in ordinary income as compensation in return for an
abstention from personal effort, then, the argument is that payments
from the sale of goodwill should be similarly treated as ordinary
income. However, this syllogistic argument fails to distinguish beiween commercial and professional goodwill. A complete transfer
of commercial or industrial goodwill (such as that associated with a
particular product) with its usual incumbent use of the name of the
business or product, might possibly have the same effect on client
patronage as a covenant not to compete. On the other hand, professional goodwill is not so susceptible to transfer because of its
innately personal quality. Thus, an actual transfer of professional
goodwill should not be likened to a commercial covenant not to compete since the latter in no way depends upon personal efforts of the
seller to influence either his or his buyer's continued client patronage.
This same reasoning also refutes, in. large part, the assumption of the
IRS that a transfer of goodwill can be made solely by the seller's
removal from the business. Professional goodwill is bound to the
person, and can be transferred only by his affirmative efforts. If the
transferor leaves the practice, the probability of client succession to
the transferee, even with the use of the name of the business, is at
20. Weiss, The Tax Treatment of a Disposition of Professional Good Vill, 73 YALE
L.J. 1158, 1176-79 (1964).
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best uncertain, since goodwill is personal and would in most instances
remain with the transferor. An affirmative effort to persuade clients
to continue to conduct business with the transferee is seriously
jeopardized by the transferor's removal. Indeed, the most effective
transfer occurs when the transferor continues in the practice in some
capacity, with the purpose of persuading clients to continue their
patronage. The sale of the partnership interest in Butler included
payment for a share of the goodwill enjoyed by the seller. Since a
removal of a share must necessarily diminish the whole, the transferor
continues to enjoy the professional goodwill only to the extent of
that remaining after the sale. In any event, the long trend of court
decisions involving transfers of professional goodwill has made it
clear that the decision in Butler was inevitable, and it is highly
improbable that future decisions will reach a different result.

